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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

BINARY BRIGHT-LINE DECISION MODELS FOR GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT:
ANALYSIS OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION
CONSIDERING SENSITIVITY TO MATERIALITY THRESHOLDS
In August, 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an update
concerning the disclosure of uncertainties about an entity’s ability to continue as a going
concern. The standard requires an entities management to evaluate whether there is
substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and to provide
related footnote disclosures in certain circumstances. One consequence of this
regulation is the need for guidance for audit testing of management’s assessments in
each phase of the audit.
This research evaluates the usefulness of bankruptcy prediction models as
analytical tools in the planning stage of an audit for going concern assertions and
questions the use of precision as the only measure of a model’s effectiveness. I use
simulation to manipulate the fundamental accounting data within five bankruptcy
prediction models, explore failure rates in an environment with materiality concerns, and
consider the total change in market value due to simulated errors. Given the inherent
limitations of the information environment and/or current prediction models, my results
indicate auditors’ current failure rates are not an indication of audit failure. The results
suggest that bright-line testing using bankruptcy prediction models are sensitive to
materiality and that the cost trade-off between Type I and Type II errors is an important
indicator of model choice.
KEYWORDS: going concern, bankruptcy prediction model, materiality, FAS 205-40,
analytical tools
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction and Motivation
A company is a going concern if it has the resources needed to remain in

existence long enough for a business to utilize all of its assets. Unless warned
otherwise, financial statement users should be able to assume that an entity will not be
compelled to liquidate its assets, end operations, or file for bankruptcy protection in the
foreseeable future. If a company is likely to be unable to meet its obligations as they
become due without extraordinary disposition of assets, debt restructuring, externallymandated operating revisions, or if management plans to liquidate or cease operations;
then certain disclosures are required in current financial statements. Investment
decisions about a company facing restructuring or bankruptcy differ greatly from
decisions about companies that are going concerns. Providing useful information for
economic decision-making is the primary objective of financial reporting; therefore,
determining whether a company is a going concern is a fundamental judgment made by
financial statement preparers.
Different reporting standards exist for companies with substantial going concern
uncertainty. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the United States (GAAP)
requires failing firms to include certain disclosures and potentially prepare their financial
statements on a liquidation basis. For example, the balance sheet classification of
assets and liabilities into current and non‐current categories is irrelevant in the
liquidation basis. In addition, the periodicity and accrual concepts lose their
relevance for distressed firms since the future economic benefit of assets is
undefined and the realization of assets for their book value is uncertain for these
firms and should be presented differently in financial statements prepared according
to the liquidation basis.
Financial Statement information is only valuable to accounting users if it is
accurate, relevant, and reliable. When an independent auditor expresses an opinion
on whether the financial statements are fairly presented in accordance with GAAP;
financial statement users should be able to make decisions with a higher degree of
confidence (Geiger, Raghunandan, & Rama, Recent changes in the association
between bankruptcies and prior audit opinions, 2005). However, external audit
reports only add credibility to financial statements if they consistently express proper
opinions (Herbohn, 2007); therefore, a proper assessment of going concern is
1

critical to expressing an opinion on whether the financial statements are presented
fairly (Carcello & Neal, 2003). A 2019 study used artificial intelligence techniques and
found that the content of the auditors’ report contained as much bankruptcy prediction
information as the entire financial report (Muñoz-Izquierdo, Camacho-Miñano, SegoviaVargas, & Pascual-Ezama, 2019). They found that the most significant variables to
distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms were the audit opinion, the Matter
sections disclosed in the audit reports, and the number of comments included in the
Matter sections and qualification paragraphs.
An audit opinion containing a going-concern qualification can have economic and
legal consequences for both the audited company and the auditor. For example, audit
firms face lawsuits if a client files bankruptcy without a warning from audit reports issued
within a year of bankruptcy. On the other hand, if an audit firm issues a going-concern
opinion and the client remains healthy, the auditor may lose future audit engagements
with the client. Although audit fees may motivate auditors to side with clients; when there
is a conflict of interests between financial statement users and those of the audit client,
the auditor’s primary responsibility is to users.
Prior research shows that auditors do not always arrive at an appropriate
audit opinion (Herbohn, 2007). Historically, the majority of companies that file
bankruptcy neither warned investors through going concern uncertainty disclosures nor
prepared the prior financial statements under the liquidation basis of accounting. Given
the high rate of errors in this judgment, research questions the information content of
and investor’s reliance on audit opinions. For decades, improving the accuracy and
timeliness of going concern uncertainty disclosures have been at the forefront of
discussion within the auditing and accounting profession.
Management and auditors can make two types of errors when issuing an
assertion about going concern. Firstly, they could fail to issue a warning for a client that
goes on to file bankruptcy in the subsequent two years. Secondly, they could modify the
language of their report to issue a warning about substantial doubt for an entity to
continue as a going concern and if that entity survived for two years, that would also be
an error. Research generally classifies these errors as Type I and Type II. I define error
types throughout the text, figures, and tables following the convention for this stream of
literature. Figure 1 defines the relationship between audit opinions, bankruptcy, and error
types used in this research.
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No Bankruptcy in
t+1

Bankruptcy in t+1

Unmodified
Audit
Opinion in t

No Error:
Viable Company

Type I Error:
Failed to Issue Warning
for Subsequent
Bankruptcy

Modified
Audit
Opinion in t

Type II Error:
Warning Issued for
Viable Company

No Error:
Warning Correctly
Issued

Figure 1: Type I and Type II Errors based on Historic Audit Opinions
Due to the predictive nature of going concern assertions, the evaluation of both
error types occurs in the subsequent period (t+1). A Type I error is made when a
failing company is classified as non‐failing (e.g. the financial statements that precede
a company’s bankruptcy, liquidation, or acquisition fail to include a warning). The
economic and social costs for this type of error can be substantial to c urrent
investors, creditors, management, and the current audit firm.
A Type II error exists if a modified audit opinion with going concern qualifications
was issued for a company that remained viable and existed without bankruptcy a year
after the report is issued. A Type II error is incorrectly classifying a healthy company
as failed. These “false positives” exist when firms that do not subsequently fail after a
going concern warning.
I follow a large body of bankruptcy research in the classification of errors used in
this research. This classification may seem to work counter to the convention of
standard hypothesis testing where Type I errors are “false positives”. The confusion is
derived from labeling companies that are failing as GCO companies. Accountants test
the assumption that the company will continue to meet its financial obligations. The null
hypothesis is that a company is not a going concern and is predicted to fail. Issuing a
GCO warning is consistent with accepting the null and giving an opinion that a company
is not a going concern. Therefor in a Type II Error, an auditor has incorrectly accepted
the null that a company will not continue. In Type I Errors, an auditor has incorrectly
rejected the null that a company will not continue.
Taffler and Citron (1992) show that only 20 percent of UK failed companies
received going concern qualifications before a bankruptcy filing. Vanstraelen (2003)
found that fewer than 26 percent of bankrupt companies received audit qualifications
3

in Belgium. Van Peusem and Chan (2012) found that only 28 percent of failed
companies received appropriate audit qualifications in New Zealand. Approximately
half of the companies going bankrupt in the U.S. do not receive a prior GCO. Geiger and
Rama (2006) find a Type I misclassification of 88 percent in the period between 1990
and 2000. Myers, Schmidt and Wilkens (2014) find a Type I misclassification of 20
percent in the period between 2000 and 2006 and suggest that increased scrutiny
improved performance in large firms, but increased Type II errors in small firms.
Research indicates that auditors are biased against issuing going concern
qualifications. From the auditors' perspective, an incorrect audit opinion may result
in expensive litigation (Hensher & Jones, 2007), loss of the audit fee, and damage
to professional reputation Kaplan and Williams (2013) find that (1) going concern
reports deter lawsuits even when auditors are named in lawsuits, (2) an ex ante going
concern report reduces the likelihood of large financial settlements. Some research
suggests that issuing such a qualification creates a self-fulfilling prophecy (Louwers &
Richard, 1999). Research indicates that Type I errors are costliest to auditors, where
it would lead to the possible loss of audit fee, professional reputation and litigation
from shareholders (Koh, 1991). Grant (1998) reports that approximately 9 percent of
auditor revenues in the U.S.A. are spent on defending lawsuits. While this
information may encourage auditors to issue more GCOs, auditors appear biased
against reporting qualifications because investors react negatively (Menon & Williams,
2010) and auditors may lose the client due to auditor switching.
While individual studies vary, approximately two thirds of companies with a GCO
do not subsequently go bankrupt. Lennox (1999) found that U.K. companies that do not
go bankrupt in the year subsequent to a GCO is approximately 80 percent. Geiger, et al.
(2005) found a Type II misclassification of 46 percent in the period between 2000 and
2003. Geiger and Rama (2006) found a Type II misclassification of 51 percent in the
period between 1990 and 2000. Feldmann and Read (2010) found a Type II
misclassification of 41 percent in the period between 2000 and 2007. Myers et al. (2014)
found a Type II misclassification of 32 percent in the period between 2000 and 2006. In
Australia, the proportion of firms with GCOs that do not subsequently go bankrupt was
88 percent, based on first-time GCOs (Carey, Geiger, & O'Connell, 2008). Evidence
from Bellovary, Giacomino, & Akers (2006) suggests the issuance of an unqualified audit
report for companies that have subsequently filed bankruptcy in the following year
reduces the public’s reliance on audit opinions. Further evidence suggests the
4

prevalence of Type II errors during the 2008 financial crisis reduced investor confidence
in accounting information and the function of audits.
The costs associated with Type I and Type II errors are likely to be quite
different. Prior research on bankruptcy prediction typically focus on (1) searches for
statistical models to improve prediction accuracy—defined by precision in count and
percentage or (2) probes for new bankruptcy predictors (financial ratios or other
explanatory variables) (Mai, 2010). Research has not provided empirical evidence of
the trade-off between models that minimize Type I error rates but increase Type II
error rates. Currently, bankruptcy prediction studies assess a model’s ability to predict
by counting total errors and generally correctly classify 95% or more of a sample into
bankrupt and non-bankrupt categories. Most models identify fewer Type I errors and the
number of Type II errors are consistently higher than the number of Type I errors.
The popular press and investors react more strongly to Type I errors; however, Type
II errors are not costless. Companies with going concern uncertainty disclosures
face higher cost of debt and negative market reactions. Models proposed to reduce
Type I errors may increase the number of Type II errors. The overall cost trade -off
between Type I and Type II errors should be considered.
The usefulness of a prediction model should consider the total cost trade-off
of errors. However, prior research does not evaluate the models based on an
estimation of these costs. Altman et al. (1977) use a lender’s decision model to
argue that a lender could trade-off 35 Type II errors for each Type I error. However,
this conclusion naïvely ignores loan size. The size of the loan and the relative cost
of errors need to be included in the evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models
(hereafter, BPMs). The purpose of this study is to capture the total market cost of
bankruptcy errors and evaluate models based on the total cost, not the number of
errors.
Since the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued SAS
No. 2 in 1974, auditors have struggled to assess a firm’s going concern status and to
develop appropriate predictive models (Akers, Giacomino, & Bellovary, 2007). In a 1987
study, auditors ranked 60 steps that comprised the audit by its level of difficulty.
“Determining the validity of the going-concern assumption” ranked fourth in that study
(Chow, McNamee, & Plumlee, 1987). A large body of research evaluates the accuracy
of auditor’s going concern predictions and finds them lacking. Often, this research
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evaluated the effectiveness of finance models by counting the number of errors as a tool
for evaluation.
Australian auditing standards recognize statistical models for assessing
going concern uncertainty. The Australian standard on Analytical Procedures (AUS
512) with reference to AUS 708 specifically highlights probit and discriminant
analysis models. The1993 Proceedings of the Expectations Gap Roundtable in the
United States called for continued research into the effectiveness of analytical
procedures and identified the use of BPMs for assessing going concern uncertainty
(Blocher & Loebbecke, 1993) American standards have historically not provided
specific examples or guidance on the selection or timing of procedures using BPMs.
Accounting Standards (SAS) No. 34 and SAS No. 59 did little to improve the
accuracy of going concern opinion issuance (Raghunandan & Rama, 1995). Research
identifies two problem areas for auditors when making a going concern judgment:
auditors have difficulty (1) acquiring or selecting information and (2) processing or
combining that information (Ho, 1994), (Rosman, Seol, & Biggs, 1999). Little guidance
has been provided to assist auditors in making going concern judgments.
The auditing standards list potential indicators of going concern uncertainty but
remain silent about the use of statistical models in assessing going concern uncertainty.
AU 341.06 includes four categories indicating going concern uncertainty: (1) negative
trends, (2) other indications of possible financial difficulties, (3) internal matters, and (4)
external matters. However, the auditing standard does not provide guidance as to how
the auditor is to interpret and assess these events. Therefore, auditors must rely on their
own judgment when assessing whether a firm’s going concern uncertainty meets the
“substantial doubt” threshold for disclosure. Research suggests using a decision aid in
the process of evaluating going concern uncertainty may be beneficial (Chung, et al.,
2012). Research has recognized the potential usefulness of objective statistical
models for assessing going concern since the Cohen commission’s report (1978) on
auditor responsibilities first suggested their use as a means toward reducing the
expectations gap. In 1993, the AICPA the USA recognized the public’s demand for
an early warning system of corporate failure (Loftus & Miller, 2000).
Research shows objective statistical models outperform auditors in assessing
company failure (Bellovary, Giacominio, & Akers, 2007). Although recent studies
question the notion (Blay, Moon Jr., & Paterson, 2016), research often proxies the
propensity to issue GCOs as an indicator of audit quality. A large body of research
6

explores substituting auditor judgment with established BPMs (BPM) as a means to
improve audit quality. Such models can help auditors form more objective
assessments of a clients’ going concern uncertainty and reduce the costs
associated with Type I and Type II errors.
Statistical BPMs provide an objective assessment of the probability of the
client failing. If a model produces a score indicating a high probability of failu re, the
auditor can classify the company as high-risk and plan to apply more rigorous audit
procedures. Koh (2012) argue that accurate statistical models can help auditors
identify high‐risk companies in the planning stages of the audit. Identifying high-risk
companies at this stage helps the auditor plan specific audit procedures aimed at
assessing the appropriateness of the going concern assumption.
However, the audit environment presents a unique challenge due to the
materiality assumption. The materiality assumption states that misstatements,
including omissions, are material if they, individually or in aggregate, could
reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of financial statement
users. SAS No. 122 addresses the auditor’s responsibility to apply the concept of
materiality in the planning stage of an audit. The auditor is charged to make
judgments about the size of misstatements that will be considered material, thus
providing a basis for determining the nature and extent of risk assessment
procedures. The standard encourages the use of a percentage applied to a
benchmark from the financial statements as a starting point for determining
materiality (i.e. performance materiality threshold defined as a percentage of profit
before tax from continuing operations). During the planning stage of an audit,
unidentified misstatements may impact the accuracy of statistical models that rely
on financial statement information. The question of how models perform in this
environment has not been explored. This dissertation provides insight to the
sensitivity of models to material misstatements present during the planning stage of
the audit.
The ability of corporate failure models to provide objective evidence for
making a going concern judgment is important (Cormier, Magnan, & Morard, 2016).
This objectivity in statistical evidence supports BPMs as a substitute for auditor
judgment in court (Kuruppu, Laswad, & Oyelere, 2003). Therefore, practitioners can
defend the reliance on an established BPM as an objective tool in court cases
claiming audit failure. If an objective model minimizes the risk of both Type I and
7

Type II errors, this defense may help practitioners avoid litigation and minimize
costs.
When a company’s going concern status becomes uncertain in the period prior to
filing bankruptcy, current regulation requires a going concern disclosure. Therefore,
many going concern studies assess prediction accuracy using samples of bankrupt and
non-bankrupt firms. Research related to BPMs often overlap going concern research. In
this literature, bankruptcy is used as a proxy for corporate failure. Despite numerous
studies in the area and regulatory updates, bankruptcy prediction rates have not
substantially improved (Gissel, Giacomino, & Akers, 2007). Figure 2 lists the ten largest
bankruptcies in United States history and highlights that only three firms issued timely
going concern warnings.

Rank
by
Size

Company Name

Date Bankruptcy
Filed

1
Lehman Brothers Holdings September 15, 2008
2
Washington Mutual
August 26, 2008
3
WorldCom
July 21, 2002
4
General Motors
June 1, 2009
5
CIT
November 1, 2009
6
Enron
December 2, 2001
7
Conseco
December 17, 2002
8
Energy Future Holdings
April 29, 2014
9
MF Global Holdings
October 31, 2011
10
Chrysler
April 30, 2009
Figure 2: 10 Largest Bankruptcies in US History

Assets

$691 billion
$327.9 billion
$103.9 billion
$91 billion
$71 billion
$65.5 billion
$61 billion
$40.9 billion
$40.5 billion
$39 billion

Going
Concern
Opinion in
Prior Year's
Audit
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

During the 2008 financial crisis, regulators and investors questioned auditors for
failing to issue GCOs in the period preceding many bankruptcies. Several hypotheses
exist for why Type I errors persist: (1) the current bankruptcy models are not sensitive
enough, (2) exogenous subsequent events prediction is beyond the scope of auditors’
duties, and (3) auditors purposely fail to issue a GCO due to client retention and
because of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” stigma that follows a GCO. However, by not
identifying an audit deficiency when Type I errors occurred during the financial crisis, the
PCAOB seemed to indicate that Type I errors are beyond the scope of an auditor's
responsibility (Gramling, Krishnon & Zhang, 2011).
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In the years after the financial crisis, the failure of auditors to issue warnings prior
to large bankruptcies continued and both the popular press and investors continued to
look toward audit firms for justifications. For example, PwC did not include going concern
uncertainty qualifications in the audit report for the financial statements prior to MF
Global Holdings declaring bankruptcy in 2011. Forbes, American Banker, and Thomson
Reuters all published articles discussing PwC’s culpability for investor losses due to MF
Global’s bankruptcy. PwC ultimately settled lawsuits including a 2015 settlement of $65
million to MF Global investors and an undisclosed amount to the bankruptcy
administrator for MF Global.
On August 27, 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB or “the
Board”) issued Accounting Standards Update No. 2014-2015 concerning the disclosure
of uncertainties about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. The standard
requires an entity’s management to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about
the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and to provide related footnote
disclosures in certain circumstances. The standard clarifies the roles of management
and auditors for going concern assertions: management will make an assertion
concerning substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern
leaving auditors to evaluate the assertion.
One consequence of this regulation is the need for guidance for audit testing of
management’s assertions in each phase of the audit. My research evaluates the
usefulness of BPMs as analytical tools in the planning stage of an audit for going
concern assertions. I use simulation to manipulate the fundamental accounting data
required by current BPMs, explore failure rates, and the associated net market costs of
inaccurate going concern assessments. Given the inherent limitations of the information
environment and/or current prediction models, my results indicate auditors’ current
failure rates are not an indication of audit failure. The results suggest that bright-line
testing using BPMs are sensitive to materiality and that the cost trade-off between Type I
and Type II errors should be considered.
Few studies address whether auditors were capable ex ante of predicting the
Type I bankruptcies during the financial crisis. Given the information presented in the
financial statements at the time of the audit and the inherent limitations of current BPMs
(BPM), auditors may not have been capable of more accurate predictions. Before
auditors can implement these models during the planning stage of the audit, several
questions concerning their appropriateness and usefulness need to be addressed.
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Specifically: (1) Are the models valid and sensitive enough to predict bankruptcies? (2)
What thresholds for quantitative planning materiality are appropriate for distressed
firms? (3) Are we asking auditors [and managers under IAS No. 1] to assume
responsibility for an impossible mission? (4) What is the relative cost of Type I and Type
II errors?
My research will address these questions using simulation methods. I will
calculate error rates considering common materiality thresholds and estimate the market
cost of each type of error. Ultimately, I will inform the discussion about the
appropriateness of a BPM as an analytical tool within a risk-based audit setting.
My research will contribute to the research in two important ways. First, my
research investigates the role of quantitative planning materiality in going concern risk
assessments and examines the sensitivity of BPMs to common thresholds for
materiality. My analysis will be useful for regulators as they prepare audit guidance in
response to proposed changes to GAAP. Second, my research investigates the relative
costs of Type I and Type II errors in going concern opinions as predicted by these
models. This information will also inform regulators about the potential costs and
benefits of using BPMs as analytical tools in an audit.
1.2

Current Regulation
The FASB issued Accounting Standards Update (ASU) “Disclosure of

Uncertainties About an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern” No. 2014-15 in
August 2014. The update includes amendments requiring management to disclose
uncertainties about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and was effective
for annual periods ending after December 15, 2016. Before the amendment, GAAP
provided no guidance about management’s responsibility to evaluate substantial doubt
for going concern or to provide footnote disclosures. The new standard applies to all
entities and requires management (1) to evaluate whether it is probable that within one
year after the date of the financial statements are issued for each reporting period
(including interim periods) the entity will be unable to meet its obligation as they become
due and (2) to disclose substantial doubt with an explicit statement or to explain how
substantial doubt is alleviated as a result of management’s plans.
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 122 amended SAS No. 59. This standard’s
update aligns GAAP with the current auditing standards: AU-C section 570 and AU-C
section 930. AU-C section 570 requires auditors to assess the adequacy of footnote
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disclosures when auditors conclude that substantial doubt for going concern exists. AUC 930 requires auditors to consider substantial doubt for going concern in interim
financial reports.
The primary objective of Statement of Auditing Standards No. 132 (2017) is to
address the provisions of ASU No. 2014-15. Statistical models are often used during the
planning stage of an audit. Horizontal and vertical analysis using certain ratios is
common and encouraged in audit standards. Research supports the use of analytical
procedures to provide quantitative audit evidence and support audit judgment through
decision aids.
1.3

Overview of Simulations and Findings
In this research, I use 10 BPM specifications as bright-line tests to predict

bankruptcy: (1) Altman’s Z-Score with 1.8 score cut-off (1968), (2) Altman’s Z-Score
(1968) with a calculated 50% probability cut-off, (3) Altman’s Z-Score (1993), (4)
Hillegeist et al.’s re-estimation of Altman’s Z-Score (2004), (5) Ohlson’s O-Score(1980),
(6) Hillegeist et al.’s re-estimation of Ohlson’s O-Score (2004), (7) Shumway’s Hazard
model at 50% probability (2001), (8) Shumway’s Hazard model at 70% probability, (9)
Merton’s KMV at 50% probability (Bharath & Shumway, 2008) and (9) Merton’s KMV at
70% probability. I compare the count and percentages of estimated errors to the errors
generated from auditor’s historic going concern opinions. I found that bright-line tests
derived from Altman’s Z-Score and Merton’s KMV outperformed auditor’s judgment in
limiting the count and percentage of Type I errors and a bright-line test derived from
Shumway’s Hazard model outperformed auditors’ judgment in limiting the count and
percentage of Type II errors. Only the Shumway Hazard model resulted in fewer total
errors than auditors’ GCO decisions in any sample.
I propose the use of these models in the planning stage of an audit where risk
assessments and testing are subject to materiality thresholds. Applying the models in
this unique setting warrants exploration into the sensitivity of the models to materiality
thresholds. I investigated the performance of each model under simulated conditions for
different definitions of planning materiality thresholds and misstatement classifications. I
found that all BMP models were sensitive to misstatements at the level of planning
materiality to varying degrees. Consistent with research, my findings suggest that
planning materiality thresholds should be lower than “rules-of-thumb” for firms with low
or negative income.
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Finally, I examine the effectiveness of auditor judgment and bright-line testing
using BMPs based on a naïve estimate of total market cost. By estimating the percent
change in share price by error type for firms in the historic condition and applying it to
the classifications generated by bright-line testing, I quantify an estimate of total market
cost for errors predicted by each bright-line test. I find that auditor judgment, the 2004
Altman Z-Score, and the Shumway model outperform other models when evaluated
based on this cost trade-off assumption. The evaluation based on market cost is
different than a counting of errors approach most often used to support the use of a
particular model.
In this dissertation, I provide empirical evidence that while BMPs may be useful
in the planning stage of an audit, measuring the effectiveness of a particular model
based on precision (count and percentage) does not capture the whole story. I provide
evidence of the appropriateness of common materiality thresholds when BPMs are used
as bright-line tests for analytical procedures during the planning stage of an audit. Using
a naïve model for estimating enterprise value, I measure the market cost trade-off
between Type I and Type II errors using changes in cumulative abnormal returns. My
study provides evidence that using precision to evaluate Type I and Type II accuracy
rather than auditor judgment would result in greater overall negative market reactions.
Overall, this research supports the value of auditor judgment and decision making in
evaluation going concern uncertainty over reliance on several financial models.
1.4

Organization
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a

review of the research related to the regulation history, reporting trends, bankruptcy
prediction in audit testing, and the evolution of BPMs. Chapter 3 develops the
hypotheses and motivation of this study. Chapter 4 addresses the research design and
methodology. Chapter 5 provides the results and statistical analyses. Chapter 6
discusses the results, limitations, and concludes.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1

Regulation Stakeholders
The FASB is not the only regulatory body that is taking interest in going concern

standards. The International Accounting Standards Board and Auditing Standards Board
have a direct interest in the FASB project.
The FASB and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have been
working closely on a project to converge the accounting standards in the US with those
practiced globally. The IASB has a fulltime liaison who monitors the FASB’s work and
the FASB also serves within the IASB and monitors their discussions and decisions. IAS
1 was originally issued in 1997 and has seen several updates since that time. Currently,
IAS 1 (25) specifies for management to make a going concern assessment while
preparing the financial statements. The IFRS Interpretations Committee was called to
provide more guidance about the timing of and purpose of going concern uncertainty
disclosures and monitor FASB’s work as they address these concerns (IFRS
Interpretations Committee, 2013).
The US Auditing Standards Board’s interest in changes to GAAP is obvious. AU
Section 341 did not assume that management is responsible for going concern
assertions and requires auditors to make predictive assessments for the following twelve
months. Despite this regulation, the PCAOB did not seem to hold auditors responsible
when going concern assertions turn out to be incorrect. In ex post reviews of audits that
fail to accurately predict and warn investors of bankruptcies, the PCAOB has not issued
deficiencies (Gramling, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011). AU-C Section 570 reaffirmed that it
was “the auditor’s responsibility to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time” (AICPA,
2017).
At a round table at the Center for Audit Quality’s Symposium (2012), breakout
groups questioned the complexity of disclosures and the overlapping information
between the MD&A section and the footnotes. The group concluded that earlier
qualitative disclosure by management with specific action plans would mitigate the need
and usefulness of going concern opinions issued by the auditor. The International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued International Standard on
Auditing (ISA) 570, “Going Concern,” which established the requirement and guidance
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for auditors to consider the appropriateness of management’s use of the going concern
assumption and auditor reporting.
While ASU 2014-15 requires managers to determine whether “substantial doubt”
exists concerning a company’s ability to continue as a going concern, research
questions whether managers are capable of accurately predicting uncertainty 12-months
and 24-months beyond the financial statement date given the information available.
What tools, if any, can be identified to assisted management in making these assertions
and auditors in assessing management’s assertions?
2.2

Regulation History
Before the most recent update, the regulation for GCOs was provided in SAS No.

59 with some clarity offered by subsequent amendments. U.S. GAAP required
companies to prepare financial statements on a going-concern basis unless (a) a
liquidation plan had been approved by the owners or (b) the plan was being imposed by
other forces and it was very unlikely that the entity would continue as a going concern.
There was considerable debate surrounding liquidation versus going concern
presentation of the financial statements, including a call for both presentations for certain
distressed firms. However, there was no specific guidance in U.S. GAAP about (1) who
was responsible for making going concern assertions, (2) management’s role in
assessing, or (3) disclosing going concern uncertainties or the timing, nature, and extent
of these disclosures. Until the August 2014 Accounting Standards Update, all of the
regulation and guidance for making these assertions came from the generally accepted
audition standards (GAAS).
Since the AICPA first issued SAS No. 2 in 1974, auditors have struggled to
assess a firm’s going concern status and to develop appropriate predictive models
(Akers, Giacomino, & Bellovary, 2007). SAS No. 2 was the first standard to specifically
address the circumstance necessary for a modified “subject to” opinion. When SAS No.
34 replaced SAS No. 2, it provided guidelines for auditors to follow when assessing
going concern uncertainty, but fell short of requiring the assessments. To address the
“expectation gap” between the role of auditors and the perception of that role, SAS No.
59 made going concern assessments a requirement for auditors but left many thresholds
and definitions up to professional judgment. Even though the regulation was tightening
and clarifying the role and expectations of auditors, SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 did little
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to improve the usefulness or accuracy of going concern opinion issuance (Carcello,
Hermanson, & Huss, 1995).
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59 (SAS 59), The Auditor's Consideration
of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, required auditors to evaluate
whether “substantial doubt” exists about an audit client's ability to continue as a going
concern. The first stage in making this going concern evaluation required consideration
of whether the results of audit procedures performed related to the various audit
objectives identify existing conditions and events that indicate “substantial doubt” about
the client's ability to continue as a going concern.
Under this standard, when auditors believed that “substantial doubt” existed, they
considered management's plans for dealing with the effects of those conditions and
events, and then concluded if “substantial doubt” remains. However, regulation fails to
provide an exact definition of what constitutes “substantial doubt”. Due to past ambiguity
of the definition of “substantial doubt,” much research investigated this threshold in
practice. Boritz (1991) concluded that a 50 to 70 percent likelihood would represent
substantial doubt. Under SAS 59, if the threshold for “substantial doubt” was met, the
auditors were required to include an explanatory paragraph in their report to reflect this
uncertainty. For example, if a client company failed to meet a debt covenant but
presented evidence that the financial institution waved the requirement and did not
consider the client to be in default, then the auditors may choose to issue a modified
opinion with certain going concern language instead of a GCO.
In June 2009, General Motors filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history
preceded by a going concern warning. Deloitte & Touch LLP provide an example of the
language used in warnings issued under SAS 59 regulations. On February 17, 2009,
General Motors filed a “Viability Plan” detailing management’s intention to continue
operating as a going concern after requesting U.S. Government funding totaling $22.5
billion to cover baseline liquidity requests. Subsequent to that filing, Deloitte & Touche
LLP’s audit report dated March 4, 2009 included the following explanatory paragraph
expressing substantial doubt about General Motor’s ability to continue as a going
concern:
The accompanying consolidated financial statements for the year ended
December 31, 2008, have been prepared assuming that the Corporation will
continue as a going concern. As discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial
statements, the Corporation’s recurring losses from operations, stockholders’
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deficit, and inability to generate sufficient cash flow to meet its obligations and
sustain its operations raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a
going concern. Management’s plans concerning these matters are also
discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements. The consolidated
financial statements do not include any adjustments that might result from the
outcome of this uncertainty. (138)

The ambiguous language in standards such as AU section 341 created problems
for litigation. In an attempt to clarify the standards, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB)
issued Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 126, The Auditor's Consideration of
an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern (Redrafted), to supersede SAS No.
59, The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, as
amended. However, SAS No. 126 did not significantly change or expand SAS No. 59
and it did not converge with the IAASB’s international auditing standard on going
concern.
In 2004, Section-104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required audit firms
registered with the PCAOB to be assessed on their compliance with professional
standards. The publicly available reports from these assessments include identified audit
deficiencies. Gramling, Krishnan, and Zhang (2011) studied the audit deficiencies
identified during PCAOB Section 104 inspections between 2004 and 2006. The stud
indicated no audit deficiencies due to the failure to issue a going concern opinion for
firms that subsequently filed bankruptcy. Their analysis did not demonstrate a significant
change in the likelihood of issuing a going concern or in Type I and Type II errors. By not
issuing deficiencies or requiring additional procedures for evaluating the likelihood of
bankruptcy, the PCAOB appear to support the adequacy of audit methods for evaluating
going concern assertions.
Since 1973, the FASB has been responsible for issuing standards of financial
accounting and reporting for the private sector. Regulators could not agree who was
primarily responsible for assessing going concern and issuing opinions: management or
external auditors. Throughout this regulatory history, the FASB has remained silent
about Going Concern reporting and management has never been required to make a
going concern prediction or assertion. As the US GAAP convergence process
proceeded, demand for breaking that silence to conform to the IAS 1 (25) grew.
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Respondents to FASB’s 2008 exposure draft for regulation concerning GCOs
expressed concerns over ambiguous language and time horizons as well as the failure
of the standard to incorporate current audit research concerning mitigating factors or
adequately explain how to prepare the financial statements under the liquidation basis.
In 2010 the Board evaluated the issues brought forth in the 2008 exposure draft and
modified the project’s objectives. In May 2012, the Board began the process of providing
guidance to management for assessing going concern uncertainty and making required
disclosing. Through the project it is expected that GAAP will provide guidance that is
more in line with international standards. IAS 1 (25) currently requires managers to
assess going concern during the preparation of the financial statements. IAS 570
requires auditors to consider the appropriateness of management’s going concern
assumption in both the planning and performing stages of the audit.
On June 26, 2013, the FASB issued an exposure draft for “Presentation of
Financial Statements (Topic 205): Disclosure of Uncertainties about an Entity’s Going
Concern Presumption” (2013) requiring management to perform going concern
assessments and provide related footnote disclosures in certain circumstances. In an
attempt to address some of the concerns from the 2008 Exposure Draft, the new draft
carefully defined “substantial doubt” and “probable” and identifies specific time horizons.
Two guidelines for disclosing uncertainties were identified according to their time
horizon-time: (1) that it is more likely than not that the entity will be unable to meet its
obligations within 12-months after the financial statement date and (2) it is known or
probable that the entity will be unable to meets its obligations within 24-months after the
financial statement date. In addition, the draft provided seven areas that should be
accessed: (1) sources of liquidity, (2) operating funds, (3) conditional and unconditional
obligations, (4) adverse conditions and events, (5) mitigating conditions, and (6) the
predicted effects of management’s plans.
On August 27, 2014, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Update No. 201415, Presentation of Financial Statements – Going Concern (Subtopic 205-40):
Disclosures of Uncertainties about an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern
(the Update). The Update defined managements’ responsibility to evaluate whether
there is “substantial doubt” about an organization’s ability to continue as a going concern
and to provide related footnote disclosures. The new standard represents both a move
toward convergence with IAS No. 1 (25) and a change in the role of auditors concerning
going concern opinions. It also defines the timing and content of disclosures. It applies to
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all companies and not-for profit organizations with an annual period ending after
December 15, 2016.
In periods after 2016, issuing going concern warnings remains a problem even
for the largest bankruptcy cases. For example, in its notes to financial statements filed
April 12, 2017, Toy’s “R” Us included the following going concern disclosure in which it
failed to issue a warning for the liquidation that occurred eleven months later:
In August 2014, the FASB issued ASU No. 2014-15, “Presentation of
Financial Statements-Going Concern (Subtopic 205-40): Disclosure of
Uncertainties about an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern” (“ASU
2014-15”). ASU 2014-15 is intended to define management’s responsibility to
evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about an organization’s ability to
continue as a going concern and to provide related footnote disclosures, if
substantial doubt exists. The amendments in this ASU are effective for reporting
periods ending after December 15, 2016, with early adoption permitted. The
Company adopted the amendments of ASU 2014-15 as of January 28, 2017.
The adoption did not have an impact on our Consolidated Financial Statements.
(2017)

In January 2015, the IAASB revised ISA 570 to expand the descriptions of
auditors’ and managements’ roles and responsibilities regarding going concern for
annual periods ending after December 15, 2016.
In response, in February 2017, the ASB issued SAS No. 132, The Auditor’s
Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern to supersede SAS
No. 126. SAS No 132 clarifies the auditor’s objectives and provides guidance related to
audit scope, timing, and explanatory language within the audit report. This standard
takes effect beginning after fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2017. The
standard requires auditors to make determinations and conclusions based on audit
evidence on whether substantial doubt exists about an entity’s ability to continue as a
going concern for a reasonable amount of time. It also includes a list of examples of
adverse conditions and events that may raise substantial doubt about an entity’s ability
to continue as a going concern. That list includes “negative financial trends,” “other
indicators of possible financial difficulties,” and other adverse key financial and liquidity
ratios. Financial and accounting researchers have long studied BPMs and other
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“negative financial trends” that are more predictive than simple trends in ratios. Because
these models are widely accepted and supported publicly in research, the results from
these models may better fulfill the evidence requirements of SAS No. 132 than simple
ratios.
2.3

Reporting Trends
Because auditors are charged to evaluate management’s assertion for a

business’ likelihood of being able to meet future obligation; investors, creditors,
shareholders, and other financial statement users expect to be warned by a going
concern disclosure of an impending bankruptcy. Audit Analytics reported that between
14.1% and 21.1% of audit opinions included going concern uncertainty language each
year between 2000 and 2016 (Whalen, Esq. & McKeon, 2018), yet investors are only
warned about 43% of bankruptcies through GCO. Compared to the accuracy of auditors’
predictions, a case for removing auditor judgment and defaulting to BPM in making
GCOs may exist.
In response to the collapses of Carillion and BHS, the British Financial Reporting
Council (FRC) issued a statement that existing going concern requirements need to be
strengthen. On March 4, 2019 the FRC unveiled proposals to make auditors apply more
robust checks and through tests when reviewing whether a company was likely to
continue as a going concern and to include an explanation for how they came to their
conclusion (Financial Reporting Council, 2019). The proposed changes to the
International Auditing Standard on Auditing (UK) 570 was available for comments as an
exposure draft until June 14, 2019. The draft did not include specific guidelines for
identifying appropriate testing. At the time of this defense, deliberations on the proposal
were ongoing.
In their review of going concern prediction studies, Gissel, Giacomino and Akers
(2007) report the model accuracy of 27 BPMs. Overall, they found that predictive abilities
from multiple discriminate analysis models achieved 78-94% accuracy, logit models
achieved 60-100% accuracy, probit models achieved 83-86% accuracy, and neural
network models achieved 77-92% accuracy. According to their research “over time, the
range of model accuracies remained consistent.” However, accuracy rates fail to
consider the trade-off of costs between both types of errors. While auditor judgment
seems less likely to predict a subsequent bankruptcy, they are also less likely to issue a
qualified opinion for a non-bankrupt firm.
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The Gissel et. al (2007) study also notes that adding explanatory variables did
not necessarily improve accuracy. This seems to support the debate that academic
conclusions based solely on statistical tests may include models that suffer from
overfitting. In the 2019 edition of The American Statistician, 43 articles are presented
that encourage researchers to consider the reliance on p-values for drawing conclusions
about associations.
Although other forms of liquidation risk exist, bankruptcy is a common proxy
throughout the research for “business failure” or identification as a “non-going-concern”.
It is important to note that going-concern assessments are a prediction about an
uncertain future and not all conditions or circumstances are knowable by the auditors at
the financial statement date. Therefore, a Type I or Type II error does not necessarily
indicate an audit failure. The PCAOB does not routinely issue audit deficiencies based
on the failure of an audit firm to issue a GCO for a company that subsequently filed for
bankruptcy1. Current auditing standards prevent auditors from considering
circumstances, events, and risks that have not yet occurred, thus constraining an
auditor’s ability to issue a GCO due to worsening market conditions.
The Cohen Commission (1978) and other research (Altman, 1993; Asare, 1990;
Louwers & Richard, 1999; Loftus and Miller, 2000) suggest that auditors' opinions were
inferior indicators of bankruptcy relative to the predictions of statistical models. However,
Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1994) reexamined the question and found that
auditors are not substantially worse. They found two research design choices to be
particularly important: partitioning the sample into stressed and non-stressed
observations and adjusting the forecast errors to reflect the proportion of bankrupt firms’
auditors face. One implication of my research is to provide information about the efficacy
of using BPMs as an analytical review tool.
My research may have further implications for documenting objective
measure criteria used during ligation. In the final stages of the audit, BPMs may
verify that a client’s overall going concern assessment is appropriate (Chen &
Church, 1996). In the event that an adverse or qualified opinion is rendered, an
objective statistical model can more readily help the auditor in justifying the decision

1

Although PCAOB inspection reports do not find material weaknesses for Type I failures,
research suggests that PCAOB inspections are associated with GCO rates. Audit firms
with recent audit deficiencies are more likely to issue a GCO for their clients (Gramling,
Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011).
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to interested parties (Chen and Church, 1992) and avoid litigation (Kaplan &
Williams, 2013).
2.4

Decision Aids
Statistical BPMs consistently outperform auditors’ going concern judgment in

discriminating between bankrupt and non‐bankrupt companies. Due to the perceived
expectations gap between auditors and financial statement users, statistical models
may assist auditors in making more accurate going concern judgments if used as a
decision aid during audit planning.
The Audit Standards Board issued SAS No. 56 in 1988. The standard formally
required auditors to use analytical procedures in all financial audits. The purpose of
analytical procedures varies across different phases of the audit (i.e. planning phase,
testing phase, and completion phase). In the planning phase, analytical procedures are
employed as attention–directing devices to inform the nature, timing, and extent of
substantive procedures performed in the testing phase. Simple quantitative techniques
involving ratio and trend analysis were the most commonly used analytical procedures
(Putra, 2010). Researchers have suggested analytical procedures be used in the
planning phase of going concern assessments (Koskivaara, 2004). Auditing standards
are silent about the use of specific statistical models in assessing going concern
uncertainty. AU 341.06 includes four categories of events that may indicate substantial
doubt about the continuation as a going concern: (1) negative trends, (2) other
indications of possible financial difficulties, (3) internal matters, and (4) external matters.
Nevertheless, the auditing standard is unclear as to how the auditor is to interpret and
assess these events.
Accounting practitioners and researchers recognize the need for reliable audit
tools to assist auditors in evaluating the going concern assertion. Kuruppu et. al. (2012)
surveyed 152 New Zealand auditors and found that auditors perceive corporate failure
models as beneficial in the planning stage of an audit. They concluded that these
models could help identify high-risk clients and alert them to expand the scope of testing.
In order to evaluate the existence of substantial doubt a company will continue as a
going-concern, the auditor must know what information to acquire as well as how to
combine that information. The auditor’s going concern assessment is a complex process
that can benefit from the use of a decision aid (Putra, 2010).
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The use of decision aids has many uses improving judgments and decision
making. Bonner, Libby and Nelson (1996) suggest that decision aids could help auditors
weight causal explanations relevant to determining a client’s ability to continue as a
going concern. Discriminate analysis common in BPMs includes a mechanical weighting
of identified variables. However, Davis (1998) finds that decision makers prefer
descriptive phrases over mechanical aggregation aids. Davis notes that decision makers
follow aid recommendations to a greater extent when aid type matches their personal
style. Analytical individuals rely more heavily on quantitative information and concrete
data (Davis & Elnicki, 1984). It follows that the use of a quantitative models (such as
BPMs) as part of the analytical procedures performed during an audit may match the
analytical decision aid with the task and personal style of auditors.
2.5

Materiality in Audit Testing
Furthermore, SAS No. 122 (AU-C Section 320) provides guidance for auditor’s

responsibility to apply the concept of materiality in planning and performing and audit of
financial statements. Auditing materiality provides a framework for the scope of the audit
and risk assessment--how much the auditor needs to look for misstatements. AU-C
Section 320 discusses materiality determinations and “tolerable misstatement.” Per the
standards, “performance materiality” should be applied to various classes of
transactions, account balances, or disclosures based on the auditor’s
judgment. “Performance materiality” is defined in AU-C Section 320 as an amount set by
the auditor “to reduce to an appropriately low level the probability that the aggregate of
uncorrected and undetected misstatements exceeds materiality for the financial
statements as a whole.” Performance materiality is used in planning to (1) determine the
scope of the audit (e.g. which financial statement areas and accounts the auditor will
focus their attention on); (2) calculate statistical sample sizes; (3) determine whether
analytical review variances should be investigated; and (4) assess the risk of material
misstatement. The auditing standards preclude the sole use of analytical procedures as
a source of audit evidence to support a significant assertion unless supported by tests of
details or controls.
AU-C Section 320 describe a basis for setting a “benchmark” to determine
planning materiality from among key financial statement items or other metrics. Auditor
judgment is required in the selection of an appropriate benchmark. Certain benchmarks
based on accounting measures may be too volatile, thus creating impractical audit scope
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and sample sizes. Benchmarks can also create comparability issues when evaluating
year-to-year waived adjustments. Levy & Jacoby recommend that auditors use relatively
stable benchmarks for determining planning materiality, such as the larger of assets or
revenues, or a measure of entity value (2016).
Research consistently finds that large accounting firms have higher materiality
thresholds than smaller firms and are less likely to issue going-concern qualifications
(Eilifsen & Messier Jr, 2015). Research examining auditors’ materiality judgments on
financial ratios such as the ratio of misstatement to current net income, inventory writedowns, and changes in accounting principles find that an item’s percentage effect on
income is the single most important factor in materiality judgments (Chewning, Pany, &
Wheeler, 1989). Results also indicate large national CPA firms have larger materiality
thresholds than smaller firms (Messier, Jr., 1983). Ryu and Roh (2007) find that firms
defining higher materiality thresholds were less likely to issue going-concern opinions to
their clients with financial problems. We would expect larger firms to have higher rates of
bankruptcy prediction error; however, Geiger and Rama (2006) investigated both types
of errors for Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms and found that both Type I and II error
rates for Big Four audit firms are significantly lower than the error rates for non-Big Four
firms.
Eilfesen and Messier (2015) examine the proprietary materiality guidance of the
eight largest U.S. accounting firms and find a high level of consistence across firms in
terms of quantitative benchmarks. They identify ten accounting measures used for
benchmarking by the largest eight firms. They report that percentages from these
fundamental accounting measurements are applied to determine overall materiality for
determining tolerable misstatement. Their results suggest that small firms set a lower
quantitative materiality threshold; however, that doesn’t translate into lower error rates.
Because the levels of materiality set by large national CPA firms in prior research did not
seem to negatively impact error rates, I use Table 3: Percentages Used for Setting
Quantitative Benchmarks from their research to select the materiality benchmarks used
in the simulations in this dissertation.
2.6

BPMs in Audit Testing
Auditing standards do not require an auditor to design specific audit procedures

to identify conditions and events that might raise questions about the validity of the
going-concern assumption. SAS No 132 requires auditors consider key financial ratios
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and adverse financial trends. In addition, auditors are required to consider whether
certain conditions or events discovered during the course of the audit contradict the
going-concern assumption. Such evidence would include information about the
company’s ability to meet its maturing obligations without selling operating assets,
restructuring debt, revising operations based on outside pressures, or similar strategies.
SAS No. 56 did not mandate specific analytical procedures for auditors to use in
their evaluation of the going concern issue; however, research often associates BPMs
with this evaluation (Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler 1994; Blocher and Loebbecke
1993; and Altman 1993).
SAS No. 59 does not specify audit procedures that auditors should use to
evaluate the going concern assumption. However, the standard highlights analytical
procedures as an example of audit procedures that may identify conditions that would
create doubt about a company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Adding a
requirement for BPMs to be performed as part of the analytical procedures of all audits
may prove useful. Research suggests, however, that auditors do not apply BPMs as part
of the analytical procedures in the planning or final stages of an audit even when the use
of analytical procedures is prescribed by the standards of that country2 (Vida &
Roghayyeh, 2011).
Similarly, SAS No. 132 provides examples of risk assessment procedures and
related activities, but falls short of recommending any specific tests, ratios, or models to
evaluate liquidity or financial distress. The standard directs auditors to base their risk
assessments on negative financial trends including “other adverse key financial ratios.” I
argue that existing BPMs would provide a stronger basis of risk assessment than
general ratio analysis.
The Proceedings of the Expectations Gap Roundtable called for continued
research on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in various contexts, including the
going concern evaluation (Blocher & Loebbecke, 1993). The Cohen Commission
indicated that statistical failure models might be considered by auditors in their overall
assessments of companies (Cohen, 1978).
BPMs may alert auditors to certain problems that are difficult to detect with
traditional auditing procedures. Altman and McGough (1974) suggested that BPMs may
help auditors’ judge companies’ abilities to continue as a going concern by alerting
2

Data from a survey of 153 Iranian auditors. Regulatory differences may impact the implementation of
similar standards within the United States.
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auditors to certain problems that may be difficult to detect using traditional auditing
procedures. Other early research presented evidence that BPMs may be useful to
auditors in making going concern judgments (Lasalle, Anandrarajan, & Kleinmann, 1996)
(Mutchler, Hopwood, & McKeown, 1997). If models are useful audit tools for evaluating a
firm’s going concern potential, then they may be helpful for making GCO assessments,
particularly as analytical procedures during the require risk assessment stage of the
audit.
2.7

Bankruptcy Prediction Models
Academic researchers and financial institutions have long used BPMs to assess

financial distress. As a suggestion for future research, Beaver (1966) introduced the
possibility that considering multiple ratios simultaneously might have higher
predictive value than a single ratio. From there, Altman’s (1968) study identified five
financial ratios out of 22 studied to form a score from discriminate analy sis using
data from 33 industrial firms. Sinkey’s (1975) study examined 110 banks using a
matched sample to identify five significant indicators out of over 100 studied.
Trieschmann and Pinches’ (1974) model classifies insurance firms as distressed or
solvent using a combination of six variables. This study advanced the models by
including a systematic factor analysis to evaluate the usefulness of the proposed
ratios.
The seminal work by Altman (1968) and McGough (1974) first suggested the
usefulness of BPMs for assessing company going concern status. They compared
their model’s 82-percent accuracy in predicting bankruptcy filings to auditors’ going
concern assessment of 46-percent accuracy. These results gave rise to a stream of
research in which researchers developed BPMs to predict company failure and
examined the usefulness of a model for assessing going concern by comparing the
accuracy of developed models to auditors’ going concern qualifications issued prior
to bankruptcy. Chen and Shimerda (1981) reviewed 27 early discriminate analysis
studies from 1932 to 1975 and tabulated which of 66 distinct financial ratios were
mentioned or found to be useful for predicting distress in each study. Since these
seminal studies, numerous models and modifications to models have been proposed
and tested. The research concerning BPMs is vast and replete with examples of models
being evaluated by count and percentage accuracy. Bellovary et al. (2007) reviewed 165
BPM journal articles published between 1930 and 2007 and determined that multivariate
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discriminate analysis and neural networks offer the most promise. Altman et al. (2014)
finds over thirty publications between 2000 and 2014 using and expanding upon the ZScore model alone. Alaka (2018) reviewed 49 BPM journal articles published between
2010 and 2015 and classified BPMs into eight categories: multiple discriminate analysis,
logistic regression, artificial neutral network, support vector machines, rough sets, casebased reasoning, decision tree and genetic algorithm. Emerging models using artificial
intelligence are criticized for operating in a “black box” and lacking explanations for
predictions. They concluded that bankruptcy prediction should be informed by an
integration of tools (Alaka, 2018).
Mulcher (1985), Hopwood, McKeown, & Mutchler (1994), Cormier et al.
(2016), and Lennox (1999) measured the number of errors identified by various
financial models and found the models to be more accurate than auditors’ prior audit
opinions. This evidence in aggregate suggests that financial models could assist
auditors in forming more accurate going concern judgments. Applying these models
could assist the accounting profession to reduce the public’s expectation gap of the
profession, and to increase the public’s confidence in the audit function.
Lennox (1999) went further to study whether stakeholders should rely on five
BPMs for decision-making rather than auditor issued GCOs: (1) Altman’s Z-Score
(1968), (2) Merton’s model (1974) (3) Ohlson’s O-Score (1980), (4) Shumway’s distance
to default model (2001), and (5) Campbell et al.’s CHS Model (2008). Default prediction
models and the auditors’ institutional environment have evolved since the 1990’s,
however research continues to question the accuracy of GCOs as predictors of default.
BPMs cannot incorporate auditors’ professional judgment and access to private
information, so a large body of research focuses on the value and quality of this
incremental information in issuing GCOs. Recently, a study (Gutierrez, Krupa, MinuttiMeza, & Vulcheva, 2016) combining GCOs and default probability models resulted in
small, although statistically significant, incremental predictive accuracy, suggesting that
the incorporation of a statistical model in the GCO assessment may be beneficial. They
also compare GCOs against changes in public credit ratings and find that GCOs have
statistically greater predictive power, which suggest that auditors compound changes in
credit ratings in their GCO assessment. A 2017 study found that private information,
including business strategy, influenced the decision of auditors to issue GCOs.
Specifically, they found that auditors commit more Type II errors when a troubled firm
exhibits a prospector business strategy (Chen, Eshleman, & Soileau, 2017).
26

For the purpose of scope and clarity, this research examines four seminal
models categorizing trends in research: discriminate analysis, logistical regression,
hazard model, and distance to default. By evaluating these four seminal models, this
research limits the scope while providing insight into four classifications of models from
the extant literature.
Zmijewski (1984), Ohlson (1980), and Altman (1968) developed early BPMs.
Ohlson and Altman employed multiple discriminate analysis (MDA). Discriminate
analysis models can be used as a decision aid to mechanically combine several
variables into a single measure, which is then used to classify a company as either
bankrupt or non-bankrupt. Many of the BPMs using MDA, however, rely heavily on
assumptions that do not hold in going-concern reporting. Logit uses maximum likelihood
estimation that does not impose the same statistical requirements on the distributional
properties of the predictors. Ohlson’s (1980) and Shumay’s (1981) model incorporated a
more complex estimation model: a logit regression. While the MDA used in Gissel et al.
(2007) reports that including more variables does not necessarily increase a model’s
accuracy. Still more bankruptcy prediction studies use logistic regression models (Chen
and Church 1992; Hopwood et al. 1994; and Mutchler et al. 1997). However, logit and
probit BPMs are criticized due to small samples sometimes used in GCO studies that
may not be statistically appropriate.
Researchers have used structural equation modeling to explore financial
dimensions and financial ratios (Ziebart, 1987). Bankruptcy prediction using structural
equation models was first introduced as distance to default which builds upon the Black
Scholes (1973) option pricing model and Moody’s structural default probability model
(hereafter, KMV) (Merton, 1974). Where other models are based on factor analysis,
distance to default is mathematically based on the assumption that a company will
default on financial obligations when its liabilities are greater than its assets.
In 2001, Shumway introduced a new way to think about bankruptcy prediction by
arguing that hazard models are more appropriate than single-models in forecasting the
outcomes of ailing firms. His research finds that a simple hazard model using both
accounting ratios and market-driven data produces consistent estimates using fewer
explanatory variables.
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2.7.1

Discriminate Model: Z-Score
The use of discriminate models in credit analysis applies financial ratios to help

lenders quantify a potential borrower’s default risk and serve as an early warning device
for changes in a borrower’s credit risk. Discriminate models consider the effects of many
key financial ratios simultaneously. One popular model used extensively in financial and
accounting research is the Altman Z-Score. Altman’s Z‐score BPM is a frequently
used benchmark for the performance of newly developed BPMs. Altman’s Z-Score
has been used in a number of different countries across various industry settings,
and has been found to outperform country-specific corporate failure models
(Eidleman, 1995).
In 1968, Edward Altman introduced the Zeta Model for predicting bankruptcy.
Rather than search for a single best ratio, Altman built a discriminate analysis model that
estimates the chance of a public company going bankrupt by combining five key
performance ratios into a single score—the Z-score. To develop the Z-Score formula,
Altman (1968) compiled a list of twenty-two financial ratios and classified each into one
of five categories (liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity). Altman selected
the ratios on the basis of their popularity in the research and his belief about their
potential relevancy to bankruptcy. Altman derived his original coefficients from a sample
of 66 bankrupt manufacturing firms from 1946 to 1965. Ultimately, the model combines
information about the company’s current profitability, long-term profitability, liquidity,
solvency, and asset efficiency into a single measure of bankruptcy risk. The Z-score’s
famous calculation gives insight on corporate financial health. While the model has been
updated and evaluated several times throughout the literature, the original model is
generalizable to publicly traded companies.
Accounting researchers, practitioners, and educators cite the Z-Score model than
any other BPM (Altman 1993), therefore I select it as my discriminate analysis model for
simulation. For sensitivity, I calculate Z-Scores for each firm-year using the 1968, 1983,
and 2004 weightings for the defined variables. I limit the pool of Z-Score derivatives due
to practical considerations3.
The five determinants of the Z-Score model and associate weightings for each
model follow. The original 1968 Z-Score formula follows:

For example, in 1977 Altman published a re-estimation of his model using 1969-1975 bankruptcies. In that study, he
trademarked the ZETATM score. I do not test the ZETATM due to issues related to the sensitivity of the cut-off.
3
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Z-Score = 1.2 (X1) + 1.4 (X2) + 3.3 (X3) + 0.6 (X4) + 1.0 (X5)

(1)

Where:
X1= Working Capital/Total Assets,
X2=Retained Earnings / Total Assets,
X3=Earnings Before Interest and Tax / Total Assets,
X4=Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities, and
X5=Sales / Total Assets

Z-scores are interpreted using a system of established rankings and ratings. In
general, the lower the Z-score, the more likely a company will subsequently file
bankruptcy. Certain cut-offs are commonly seen in the literature. A Z-Score lower than
1.8 indicates severe financial distress; a Z-Score above 2.99 suggests that a company is
a Going Concern (or a “prompt payer”); and a Z-Score between 1.81 and 2.7 predicts
that a company has an increased probability of insolvency. Altman classified anything
less than 1.81 as clearly fell into a “deadbeat” category and predicted to go bankrupt. Zscores have since been converted to credit ratings using conventional cutoffs: 4 – AAA,
3.5 – AA, 2.9 – A, 2.5 – BBB, 2.25 - BB, 2 – B, 1.8 – C, and less than 1.8 D. I apply
these definitions as a bright-line test, where a Z-Score less than 1.8 would predict a
going concern modification.
Studies suggest that bankruptcy model predictions are more accurate than
auditor opinions in signaling impending failure (Koh 1991; Altman 1982; and Altman and
McGough 1974). The accuracy of auditors signaling impending failure ranged from 40%
to 54% in pre-SAS No. 59 studies, while the accuracy of the models ranged from 82% to
93%. Altman and McGough (1974) provided a link between BPMs and auditors’ opinion
decisions by comparing the accuracy of Altman’s (1968) BPM to auditors’ opinions prior
to the bankruptcy event. They analyzed the model’s predictions and auditors’ opinions
for 34 firms that filed bankruptcy during the 1970-1973 period. The results indicated that
the Z-Score model correctly signaled impending failure prior to bankruptcy in 82% of the
cases. They reported that auditors’ opinions signaled impending failure in only 46% of
the cases.
Altman (1982) extended the evaluation of Altman’s original Z-Score model in the
auditors’ opinion context using two additional samples: (1) 37 bankrupt firms from 19741978 and (2) 44 bankrupt firms from 1978-1982. The Z-Score model correctly signaled
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impending failure for 81.1% (93%) of the 1974-1978 (1978-1982) companies;
additionally, he reported that auditors issued GCOs to 59.5% (40%) of the 1974-1978
(1978-1982) companies. These results suggest Z-Score model (auditors) provided early
warning signals of subsequent failure in 86.2% (48.1%) of the cases.
Over the last half century, many researches have studied and updated the
coefficients to reflect larger samples, more recent samples, and samples of firms from
both more diverse and more specialized industries. Hillegeist et al. (2004) conclude that
several of the coefficients in accounting-based bankruptcy models have changed
possibly due to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and asbestos-related bankruptcies in
the manufacturing industry. For robustness, I examine the error rates using two
subsequent versions of Altman’s Z-Score: the Altman et al.(1983) coefficients expand
beyond manufacturing firms and the Hillegeist et al. (2004) coefficients that update using
756 bankrupt firms from 1980-2000.

Z-Score83 = 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4)

(2)

Z-Score04 = 4.34 + 0.08 (X1) - 0.04 (X2) + 0.1 (X3) + 0.22 (X4) – 0.06

(3)

(X5)

I also examine a subset of firms from the financial industry. These firms face
a unique regulatory environment. The Gramm-Leach-Billey Act and the more recent
financial crisis were particularly important among financial firms. The probability of
bankruptcy of financial firms and performance of statistical models may be distorted
in my sample because of the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. I remove these firms for sensitivity
analysis.
Following Hillegeist et al. (2004), I estimate the probability of bankruptcy as
(e

Score

/1+eScore) for Z-Score, Z-Score93 and Z-Score04. I evaluate the score using a

bright-line test that predicts a going concern modification when the predicted
probability of bankruptcy is greater than fifty percent.
Studies using multiple discriminant analysis often use a matched-sample or
equal-group-size sample approach. Because discriminant analysis optimally
classifies between the two given sample groups, a matched sample is not
necessary. George and Mallery (2003) explain that because prior probabilities can
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be computed from the individual samples by weighing, discriminant analysis does
not require equal group sizes.
2.7.2

Logit Model: Ohlson
Created by James Ohlson in the 1980’s, the Ohlson Score model (O-Score)

introduced a bankruptcy prediction indicator generated from a set of balance sheet
ratios. Ohlson’s model was derived from a much larger sample (2,058 public companies
including 105 bankruptcies) than the Z-Score model (66 companies including 33
bankruptcies). The O-Score used a sample of bankrupt firms from 1970 to 1976 to
identify a 9-factor linear combination of coefficient-weighted business ratios which are
available in standard annual reports provided by publicly traded corporations. The OScore Model estimates the probability of failure using a logit regression. He found that
using the probability cut-off point of 3.8% minimized Type I and Type II errors and
correctly classified 87.6% of his bankrupt sample and 82.6% of his non-bankrupt
sample. One of the advantages of this model as an analytical tool at the planning stage
of an audit is that it is entirely an accounting-based model and that it is relatively simple
and the results are intuitive. The most current BPMs that employ machine learning
methods are criticized for the lack of explainability in the results. The O-Score produced
by Ohlson’s model is readily interpreted as the probability of bankruptcy.
Ohlson ultimately identified six variables from previous approaches and added
three dummy control variables to create his predictive model of nine weighted variables:
O-Score= 1.32 + 0.41(X1) – 6.03(X2) + 1.43(X3) – 0.08(X4) + 2.37(X5) +

(4)

1.83(X6) – 0.285(X7) +1.72(X8) + 0.52(X9)

Where:
X1 = Adjusted Size (AS): Ohlson measures a company’s size as its total assets adjusted
for inflation. Smaller companies are deemed to be more at risk for failure. AS =
log(Total assets/GNP price-level index).
X2 = Leverage Measure (LM): Designed to capture the indebtedness of a company, the
more leveraged the more risk the company is to shocks. LM = Total liabilities/Total
assets.
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X3 = Working Capital Measure(WCM): Even if a company is endowed with assets and
profitability, it must have sufficient liquidity to service short-term debt and upcoming
operational expenses to avoid going bust. WCM = Working capital/Total Assets.
X4 = Inverse Current Ratio (ICR): This is another measure of a company’s liquidity. ICR
= log(Current liabilities/Current assets).
X5 = Discontinuity Correction for Leverage Measure (X): Dummy variable equaling one if
total liabilities exceeds total assets, zero otherwise. Negative book value in a
corporation is a very special case and hence Ohlson felt the extreme leverage
position needed to be corrected through this additional variable.
X6 = Return on Assets (ROA): An indicator of how profitable a company is, assumed to
be negative for a close to default company. ROA = Net income/Total Assets.
X7 = Funds to Debt Ratio: A measure of a company’s ability to finance its debt using its
operational income alone, a conservative ratio because it does not include other
sources of cash. If the ratio of funds from operations to short-term debt is less than
one the company may have an immediate problem. FTDR = Funds from
operations/Total liabilities; where Funds from operations = pretax income +
depreciation.
X8 = Discontinuity Correction for Return on Assets: Dummy variable equaling one if
income was negative for the last two years, zero otherwise.
X9 = Change in Net Income (Y): Designed to take into account any potential progressive
losses over the two most recent periods in a company’s history. CINI = (Net income
t

- Net income t-1) / (Net income t + Net income t-1 )
Like Altman’s original model, the original O-Score has been extensively followed

and updated through literature. Begley et al. (1996) replicated the methodology on a new
sample and didn’t find Ohlson’s original precision rates to hold. For robustness, I also
examine the model using the updated coefficients from Hillegeist et al. (2004):
O-Score= 5.91 - 0.04(X1) – 0.08(X2) – 0.011.43(X3) + 0.01(X4) –

(5)

1.20(X5) – 0.18(X6) – 0.01(X7) – 1.59(X8) + 1.10(X9)

Following Hillegeist et al. (2004) I convert each O-Score into a probability using the
formula Probability = (eScore/1+eScore). This model allows for a bright-line test where a probability
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of bankruptcy of greater than 0.5 indicates a company is “more likely than not” to fail the going
concern assumption.
Studies have generally found the O-Score to be a better forecaster of bankruptcy
than the 1968 Altman’s Z-Score. The O-Score even outperforms updated variations of
the Z-Score model. However, past research is mixed. Studies found no significant
difference in accuracy between MDA models and logit analyses (Collins and Green,
1982; Cormier et al., 1995; Allen and Chung, 1998). Neither model has been able to
regularly beat the predictive accuracy Merton’s Distance to Default. Therefor I move
away from discriminate analysis and BPMs that use only accounting-based numbers.
2.7.3

Distance to Default Model: Merton’s KMV
Introduced as the “Kealhofer-Merton-Vasicek” model (hereafter, Merton’s KMV)

in 1974, the distance-to-default estimates the probability a firm will default by comparing
the firm’s value to the face value of the firm’s debt. The model uses simultaneous
equations to measure the distance between the expected value of the assets (drawing
from assumptions in the Black-Scholes option pricing theory) and the default point to
calculate the probability of default. To calculate the probability, the model subtracts the
face value of the firm’s existing debt from an estimate of the future market value of the
firm and then divides this difference by an estimate of the volatility of the firm (scaled to
reflect the horizon of the forecast). The ratio is substituted into a cumulative density
function to calculate the probability that the value of the firm will be less than the face
value of debt. The resulting score is referred to as the expected default frequency
(hereafter, EDF).
Merton’s KMV uses a two-step process to set the default point as somewhere
between short-term debt (LCT) and the total debt (LT). The first step to calculate the
EDF is to derive parameters needed in estimation:
1. Returns and volatility of equity over the previous year;
2. Market rate of equity: total number of stocks times the closing stock price (S);
3. Risk-free interest rate (r);
4. Liabilities maturing in one year (LCT); and
5. And short-term liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities (TD).
The second step simultaneously solves two linear equations to derive value (μ)
and volatility (σ) of the firm’s assets. And, finally, distance-to-default and probability to
default are calculated. I interpret EDF as the percentage likelihood of bankruptcy.
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Research suggests that regulation requires an uncertainty disclosure for uncertainty
assessed at somewhere between 50% and 70%. Therefore, I set bright-line testing
thresholds for GCO judgments at EDF greater than 0.5 and EDF greater than 0.7.
The major disadvantage of Merton’s model lies in its complexity and its need for
market-based data. Not all audit firms have access to the market-based information
needed to run the model and not all audit clients are publicly traded, which makes it
impractical as a potential analytical tool for private companies and small audit firms. In
order to use the Black-Shoal’s bond pricing model, distance to default makes two
important assumptions. First, that the total firm value follows a Brownian motion. The
second is that the firm has only one discount bond maturing in the time-period.
2.7.4

Hazard Model: Shumway
For decades, accountants and economists employed static, single-period models

to predict bankruptcies. In his 2001 study, Shumway argues that the use of a discrete
hazard model for forecasting bankruptcy is more appropriate than single–period models
because it recognizes that companies change over time. Hazard functions (often used in
survival analysis) determine the probability that an entity will experience an event (e.g.
bankruptcy) within a defined time-period, given the risk that the event might occur. In the
bankruptcy setting, hazard models measure a firm’s “health” as a function of its latest
financial condition. Unlike static models, hazard models utilize panel data to control for
how long a firm is at risk of failure and impound information. Shumway’s model is
essentially a multi-period dynamic logit model.
Shumway’s bankruptcy forecasting technique estimates a discrete-time hazard
model with a logit program consisting of several accounting ratios and market-driven
variables (Shumway, 2001). In his re-estimation of Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984),
Shumway found that many of the determinants from these models were unrelated to
bankruptcy after market driven variables were introduced and he explicitly controlled for
each firm’s period at risk (Shumway, 2001). He also incorporated market variables such
as market size, past stock returns, and idiosyncratic returns variability as bankruptcy
predictors. He found that a multi-period logit outperformed traditional MDA for his sample
including 300 bankrupt firms.
Shumway_Score = -13.03 – 1.982(X1) + 3.593(X2) – 0.467(X3) - 1.809(X4) +
5.791(X5)
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(6)

Where:
X1 = Return on Assets (ROA): The ratio of net income to total assets measures
profitability of a firm.
X2 = Leverage Measure (LM): Designed to capture the indebtedness of a company, the
more leveraged the more risk the company is to shocks. LM = Total liabilities/Total
assets.
X3 = Average Relative Size: The logarithm of each firm’s size relative to the total size of
the NYSE and AMEX market.
X4 = Abnormal Returns: Each firm’s past excess return in year t as the return of the firm
in year t-1 minus the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX index return in year t-1;
where each firm’s annual returns are calculates by cumulating monthly returns.
X5 = Sigma: The idiosyncratic standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns. Sigma is
related to variable cash flows and may measure something like operating leverage.
Again, this model is more complex than the discriminate analysis and scores
produced by the Z-Score and O-Score models. The need for market-based data limits
the practical application and usefulness of this model during audit planning for private
clients and small audit firms.
2.8

Proprietary Models
Large audit firms have developed and used internally developed BPMs for years.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC) designed an econometric model to quantify the
relationship between observed business conditions and the incidence of bankruptcy
filings (Pate, 2003). Similar to discriminate analysis, PwC’s measure focuses on five
factors that influence the level of bankruptcy filings: degree of corporate leverage, cost of
borrowing, prevalence of excess production capacity, change in high-yield debt
issuance, and aggregate economic activity. Deloitte utilizes a “data analytics” tool
specifically to identify first-time defaulters (Deloitte Center for Financial Services, 2011).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that large audit firms use a combination of ratio analysis
and proprietary models to analyze the likelihood of bankruptcy. These models, however,
are not publicly available or vetted in the academic literature.
Mai’s (2010) dissertation also examines these four models. Her empirical results
show that combining Shumway’s model with accounting ratios and market-driven
variables improves bankruptcy forecasting accuracy and precision. She also ranks the
precision of these models with the best results from Shumway (2001), Altman (1993),
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Ohlson (1980), and Zmijewski (1984). My dissertation adds to this discussion by
evaluating the models based on market cost in addition to precision.
2.9 Cost Estimation
Many market participants view the auditor’s report as a critical component for
warning of imminent going-concern problems (Venuti, 2009). Auditors are charged with
warning stakeholders through issuing going concern opinions to decrease investor
surprise. While companies do not always enter liquidation through bankruptcy, investors
tend to equate going concern opinions as a prelude to bankruptcy. The expectation is
that auditors’ going concern qualifications will minimize losses at the time of bankruptcy
by providing investors with an ex ante signal. Given the frequency of bankruptcies that
occur with no warning, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the role of GCOs as a
warning system. Some research defines “audit failure” as only those situations where
clients become bankrupt within the next financial reporting period when auditors failed to
issue a going-concern.
Evidence suggests that there is a large gap between the warnings that investors
expect auditors to provide, and the actual warnings issued (Carson, et al., 2013).
Investors, legislatures, the popular press, and the public at large expect auditors to issue
a warning before each bankruptcy. From January 2001 to December 2017, audit firms
issued 48,053 going concern warnings. During the same period, 2,698 corporations filed
bankruptcy. However, a warning preceded only 43% of the actual bankruptcies. Not only
did they fail to issue a warning 1,994 times (Type I error); they issued 46,539 false
warnings. The top 10 largest bankruptcy filings in U.S. history occurred between April,
2001 and December, 2016 (see Figure 2). Only three of those companies included
qualifying language to warn investors of substantial doubt for the company’s ability to
continue as a going concern in their annual report prior to the filing. Each of these large,
unwarned bankruptcies caught international media attention and investors questioned
auditor reliance.
The FASB issued an update in August 2014 to provide guidance in U.S. GAAP
about management’s responsibilities in evaluating going concern uncertainty and
disclosure requirement for an entity’s financial statement footnotes. While the role is
technically different, the ability of auditors’ to evaluate these disclosures and to predict
financial distress and impending bankruptcy is paramount in improving the reputation
and value of the audit report to stakeholders. Therefore, there is continued interest in
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improving the accuracy rate of GCO reporting and reducing the associated costs of both
Type I and Type II errors.
As noted, research assesses the value of a prediction model by comparing the
percentage of firms, bankrupt and non-bankrupt, predicted correctly by the model. We
argue this fails to capture the impact of the nature of the costs of errors.
Altman et al. (1977) estimate the relative cost of errors using the bank loan
function and argue that a representative approximate cost for Type I errors is “in the
vicinity of” 70% of the amount of the loan, and the cost for Type II errors is equal to
between 2-4% of the amount that could have been lent, The cost of Type II errors for this
study was an estimate of the opportunity cost of not earning the spread on the loan.
They conclude that the cost trade-off is approximately 35 Type II errors have the
equivalent cost to lenders as one defaulted loan. They use this trade-off when
determining the optimum cut-off for ZETATM. However, this proposed trade-off does not
consider loan size. The size of the firm (or loan amount) and the relative cost of errors
should be included in the evaluation of BPMs. Their model also studies the costs from a
lender perspective and fails to consider other market participants.
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the necessity of incorporating the
costs of errors to properly assess the models’ trade-off between errors as well as in
evaluating one model against another. I use changes in total market capitalization to
show how incorporating both Type I and Type II error costs impact the evaluation of
models. It may seem obvious to some that the usefulness of a prediction model cannot
be fully assessed without considering these costs; however, the extensive body of
research examining and using the ability of financial statement information to predict
bankruptcy does not yet include this assessment. This study attempts to fill this void.
The second piece of this research is to quantify the costs of both Type I and
Type II errors. Although, quantifying the total cost of errors in going concern assertions is
difficult, limited attempts at estimating the trade off in costs have been made. Carson et
al. (2013) calls for more research in the cost of errors. My research attempts to answer
this call. I define a Type I error cost as the total change in market capitalization to a
bankrupt firm, and a Type II error cost as the opportunity loss from not lending to a nonbankrupt firm (or a gain from lending to a non-bankrupt firm). The market capitalization
of a company represents the value that the market places on the entire company. Market
capitalization represents total enterprise value of all the company’s outstanding stock:
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the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. I evaluate bankruptcy
models by calculating the overall market cost for errors produced by each model.
Krishnan and Krishnan (1993) research the cost trade-off that arises when
auditors issue qualified opinions. They conclude that auditor’s litigation risk and client
retention are important factors influencing an auditor’s decision to issue a qualified
opinion. Audit firms often lose audit fees as a result of auditor-switching when going
concern opinions are issued (Carey, Geiger, & O'Connell, 2008). There is a large stream
of research that follows the impact of client retention on independence and the issuance
of qualified opinions, including going concern opinions. In addition, the implementation of
new models within analytical procedures would not be costless, because the level of
testing required for a given engagement affect audit fees. My work, however, ignores
these costs. Instead, I focus on the cost of bankruptcy surprise for investors in the stock
market.
Kausar, Kumar and Taffler’s (2009) study provides insight on the type of
investors trading based on GCOs information and describes these trades in terms of a
lottery system. According to their work, GC investors are similar to retail investors who
have a greater propensity to gamble and have specific socioeconomic and regional
characteristics. They conclude that this gambling activity may add noise to the market
and cloud investors’ ability to respond rationally to the unambiguous bad news signal
conveyed by a GCO. Winchel, Vanervelde, and Tuttle’s experimental work, however,
suggests that the reliability of the GCO signal would contribute to market pricing (2017).
They conclude that GCOs will meet their objectives of informing investors of impending
bankruptcies and stabilizing the stock prices of viable companies only when GCOs are
highly reliable. This would suggest that research and models that improve the accuracy
rates of bankruptcy prediction and GCO issuance are necessary to improve the
usefulness of GCOs. However, it also demonstrates the difficulty of calculating the total
impact of changes in Type I and Type II errors.
Davydenko, Strebuaev and Zhao (2012) use a large sample of firms with
observed prices of debt and equity that defaulted over fourteen years to estimate the
cost of default for an average defaulting firm. They find the average cost of default to be
21.7% of the market value of assets. The costs vary from 14.7% for bond renegotiations
to 30.5% for bankruptcies, and are substantially higher for investment-grade firms
(28.8%) than for highly levered bond issuers (20.2%).
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In their ex post study of Belgium firms, Carcello, Vanstrael, and Willenborg
(2009) provide evidence that after Belgian auditing standards were introduced that
required compliance to two specific criteria, there was a decrease in Type II errors and
an increase in Type I errors. The research goes on to estimate the net cost of this tradeoff in errors for creditors, auditors, companies, and employees. Earlier work by Carcello,
Hermanon, and Huss provides guidance for estimating the net market cost of changes in
Type I and Type II failures (1995).
I use a simple model that captures cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter, CAR)
within the three-day or five-day window surrounding a bankruptcy announcement to
estimate the trade-off of costs between Type I and Type II errors. Prior research finds
that GCOs provide some explanatory power and should therefor reduce market surprise
surrounding the bankruptcy announcement period. CAR should be less negative for
firms with GCO warnings than those without (Type I error). However, distressed firms
that survive (Type II errors) would also experience unusually negative CAR when GCOs
are announced. I acknowledge that this approach fails to capture litigation and other
costs of bankruptcy directly. I loosely replicate Carcello et al. (1995), Chen and Church
(1996), and Davydenko, Strebuaev and Zhao (2012) to investigate the trade-off in cost
associated with lowering Type II errors using the various models. I use ex post data to
simulate the effect of using BPMs as criteria for going concern assessments.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
A vast research explores BPMs (Bellovary, Giacominio, & Akers, 2007). Most of
this research focuses on improving the efficacy of a particular model or comparing the
efficacy of one or more models as tools for prediction. While some researchers conclude
that the existing models are not useful for prediction, others find that using these models
as decision tools for determining going concern risk results in higher accuracy rates than
current auditor judgment.
The literature, however, fails to consider the materiality qualification in auditors’
assertion. In the audit opinion, the scope of the audit is limited and auditors explain that
“they have reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement” (emphasis added). This means that accounting numbers and
estimates may differ from actual firm performance within a predetermined threshold for
materiality. When testing the sensitivity of bankruptcy models, prior research has not
explored the possibility that “immaterial” changes in accounting fundamentals may
create material differences in the outcome of bankruptcy models that are driven by these
amounts.
Although there is no set standard for the quantity of materiality, SAS No. 2 (1985)
states that an amount is material if “its omission or misstatement could influence
the economic decision of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.” The level
of materiality depends on the size of the item or error judged within particular
circumstances. Thus, the concept of materiality provides a threshold or cut-off point
rather than providing a primary qualitative characteristic for useful information.
3.1

Research Question 1: Model Sensitivity
A few “rule-of-thumb” levels for quantitative materiality (e.g. five percent of net

income, 0.5 percent of total assets, one percent of total equity) exist in practice (U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 1999). AU Section 312.34 specifically warns that
quantities deemed immaterial according to rules-of-thumb would be considered material
if they trigger loan-covenant default. The sensitivity of BPMs (and thus economic
decisions predicted by them) to these rule-of-thumb levels for quantitative materiality has
not been tested empirically. Moreover, prior research does not provide evidence about
whether assuming unreported “bad news” within these materiality levels would improve
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the predictability and accuracy rate of existing bankruptcy models. My research
examines this question.
RQ1: Ex post, how sensitive are current bankruptcy models to small changes in
the accounting fundamentals within the prior year's annual report?
Using accounting fundamentals and existing bankruptcy models, I will calculate
the likelihood of default for firms and compare the results to known bankruptcies.
Through simulation, I will manipulate the accounting fundamentals of each firm
assuming negative outcomes within rule-of-thumb materiality thresholds and document
the changes in prediction and accuracy rates. I predict that the accuracy of current
bankruptcy models will not significantly improve through simple mathematical
manipulations of accounting fundamentals at magnitudes less than the materiality
thresholds used by the auditing profession as rules-of-thumb.
H1a: Bankruptcy models predict all bankruptcies.
H1b: BPMs are robust within rule-of-thumb materiality changes in accounting
fundamentals.
3.2

Research Question 2: Decision Sensitivity
I recognize that any amount which would cause a change in investor decisions

should be considered material by definition. If a change in accounting fundamentals
changes the outcome of a bankruptcy model, then the change in the underlying
accounting, regardless of size, would be material. Misstatements typically impact one or
two accounts, while BPMs weigh information about the overall company. It is not obvious
if a particular BPM will be sensitive to relatively small misstatements. However, the
appropriateness and magnitude of materiality as they apply to bankruptcy decisions
using models has not been explored directly through research. Therefore, I question the
sensitivity of bankruptcy models to materiality thresholds.
RQ2: How often would an event within the level auditors consider “standard
materiality” trigger a failure in the model?
Through simulation I will manipulate the accounting fundamentals of each firm as
with H1 and identify firms whose bankruptcy prediction score from a given model
changes due to “immaterial” fluctuations. After identifying these firms, I will consider if
the change in prediction from the model reflects the ex post outcomes of the firm (i.e.
bankruptcies reported in the following two years). I predict that current bankruptcy
models are not sensitive enough for “immaterial” changes to improve predictive accuracy
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rates. In other words, I predict that BPM accuracy rates will not change if fundamental
accounting inputs change by an immaterial amount.
H2: Bright-line decisions based on BPMs are robust within rule-of-thumb
materiality changes in accounting fundamentals.
3.3

Research Question 3: Cost of Investor Surprise
Historically, more than half of the bankruptcies filed for public companies in a

given year were preceded by a going concern warning. Given the failure rates of going
concern predictions and the availability of other—often more timely--information,
stakeholders question the usefulness of going concern disclosures. The failure to warn
investors of impending bankruptcies has caught the attention of investors, media, and
regulators. Research related to the “self-fulfilling prophecy” nature of going concern
opinions cautions any attempt to quantify the costs of either failing to issue a going
concern qualification or issuing one for a company that continues to operate. However,
investor surprise is not costless. Some attempt has been made to estimate the cost
trade-off from a lender perspective, but the overall economic impact has been ignored.
While the absence of comprehensive cost models make it difficult to address the
economic impact of inaccurate predictions, estimating the cost of investor surprise does
provide some insight into the trade-off between issuing too many going concern opinions
and issuing too few.
RQ3: What is the cost of investor surprise for bankruptcies when auditors failed
to issue going concern opinions?
Bankruptcy is costly to investors. While the total cost of bankruptcy is difficult to
quantify, I measure the cost by examining the market reaction around the date a
bankruptcy was announced (i.e. the bankruptcy filing date). I predict a negative market
reaction on that date. Chen and Church (1996) find that investors do respond to going
concern opinions and provide evidence of a significantly stronger negative reaction to
bankruptcy news for firms who file bankruptcy in the absence of a going concern
warning. I apply their methods to my sample and predict similar outcomes.
H3: The estimated market cost due to “surprise” from Type II errors is zero.
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3.4

Research Question 4: Cost Trade-off
Further, I continue to question the expanded use of BPMs and their sensitivity to

auditors’ materiality. I explore the trade-off in costs for using bankruptcy models for
going concern assertions.
RQ4: What is the cost trade-off for using BPMs as a decision-aid for going
concern assertions?
Managers and auditors have access to private information that may mitigate the
risk identified by BPMs. However, some research suggests that using these models
provides a more accurate basis for making this determination. I question the cost tradeoff when bankruptcy models are used as a bright-line test for issuing going concern
opinions. Altman et al. (1977) defines a 1:35 ratio between Type I and Type II error costs
based commercial bank loan analysis framework. I measure the overall market cost of
errors by applying CAR to the total market capitalization for firms. I evaluate and rank
BMPs based on their total market cost of errors.
H4a: The cost of Type I Errors is more than 35 times the cost of the average
Type II Error.
I then apply the average CAR to the simulated errors to measure the cost of
changes in predictions due to immaterial misstatements.
H4b: The change in total cost of errors due to simulated misstatements is zero.
H4c: A 1% decrease in Type I error costs results in a greater than 35% increase
in Type II error costs.
After considering the results from testing the hypotheses above, my research
should address whether or not BPMs are an appropriate analytical tool for managers or
auditors to use in making and testing going concern assertions. The results also provide
information about the sensitivity of bankruptcy models to “standard materiality”
assumptions within accounting fundamentals and provide insight about the
appropriateness of these models within an audit.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This study is designed as an ex post analysis using archival data for a sample of
688 firms that filed bankruptcy between 2002 and 2017. I conduct analyses using BPMs
and going concern prediction models from the current literature. Going Concern
Opinions are available on Audit Analytics beginning in 2002. Access to fundamental
accounting data and market data required to calculate the probability score for
bankruptcy generated by various models from prior research (Altman's Z, Zmijewski's
score, distance to default, etc) or a probability score generated through current going
concern prediction models are available through Compustat and CRSP. Materiality
thresholds are manipulated through simulation (5% of net income, 1% of total sales,
0.3% of total assets, 0.5% of total assets, and 1% of retained earnings). I will manipulate
the size (materiality) of an event required by each model to reduce Type II error to the
level predicted by FASB’s exposure draft. I will follow prior research to form a
conservative estimate of the reduction in market cost (from increased Type I error) of
accepting each model. I will also explore a long-window trend for these models to
determine if long-term downward trends resulted in higher prediction accuracy than onetime shocks.
4.1

Data and Sample Selection
Data available from Audit Analytics – Bankruptcy Notifications identifies 2,698

bankrupt filings from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2017. Of this original
sample, two filings were unclassified, 572 filed Chapter 7, and 2,124 filed Chapter 11.
Data available from Audit Analytics – Audit Opinions identifies 283,219 audit opinions
from January 1, 1999 through December 31, 20016. I matched the bankruptcy data from
audit analytics to the audit opinion from prior fiscal years’ filings using the date range
beginning 730 days prior to the bankruptcy filing date. Using this definition, if an auditor
predicted a bankruptcy up to two years prior to the filing date, my results would not
reflect a Type II error. Some firms had more than one audit report filed within this range.
620 firms with bankruptcies were not matched to an audit report within 730 days of the
filing date. My final matched sample includes 279,761 observations with 3,458
bankruptcies and 48,053 going concern opinions.
Current accounting and auditing standards explicitly allow for some Type II
errors. ASU No. 2014-2015 uses “probable” in the standard to define when an auditor
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should include language about “substantial doubt” for going concern. The standard
states:
Substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern exists
when relevant conditions and events, considered in the aggregate, indicate that it
is probable that the entity will be unable to meet its obligations as they become
due within one year after the date that the financial statements are issued (or
available to be issued). The term probable is used consistently with its use in
Topic 450, Contingencies. [emphasis added]
This language is important because it identifies a specific threshold for testing. In
the early 1990s, the General Accounting Office urged FASB to clarify the continuum in
SFAS 5 because it had found that, in practice, “probable” meant as high as 95%. A
GASB survey of CPA firms defined “probably” as 75-80 percent. The Federal Accounting
Standards Advisory Board discussed the definition of probably in their January 17-18,
2007 meeting and came up with ambiguity and uncertainty around identifying a specific
percentage. In general, “probable” has a higher threshold than “more-likely-than-not”. In
practice, the "probable" threshold is generally understood to mean a 70 to 75 percent
confidence level while the "more likely than not" threshold generally equates to 50
percent or less. Since “more-likely-then-not” is 50 percent, and the low end of firm
estimates “probable” at 70 percent, I test at each of these endpoints. Because ASU No.
2014-2015 requires auditors to issue GCO when a company has 50-70% likelihood of
filing bankruptcy, when the standard is perfectly applied 30-50% of GCO’s issued should
be false positives and result in Type II errors. Figure 3 shows the error rates expected by
the standards given a sample size of 279,761 with 3,458 bankruptcies.
The 2x2 matrix follows the same structure as Figure 1. This matrix shows that
Type II errors are prescribed by the standards. The error rates expected by the
standards given the sample size and subsequent bankruptcies for this study. My sample
includes 3,458 bankruptcies. According to the standard, auditors should issue a warning
within one year of every firm that is more likely than not to file bankruptcy within one
year. If I follow auditors’ definition of “more likely than not” as a 50% probability, the
standards suggest that 6,916 GCOs would be issued and 50% would be correct (3,458)
with 3,458 Type II errors expected. They would correctly predict a bankruptcy half for
half of the GCOs issued. If auditors used a 70% threshold for firms that will file
bankruptcy within two years, then 1,482 Type II Errors would be still be expected. The
figure highlights that the standard prescribes Type II Errors, but not Type I Errors.
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Unmodified Audit
Opinion in t

Modified Audit
Opinion in t

No Bankruptcy in t+1

Bankruptcy in t+1

No Error:

Type I Error:

272,845 – 274,821

0

Type II Error:

No Error:

1,482 - 3,458

3,458

Figure 3: Diagram of Expected GCOs, Type II Errors, and Type II Errors given Sample
Size
Figure 4 shows the number of historical errors observed in the sample based on
GCOs issued and bankruptcies filed within 730 subsequent days. Note that both Type I
and Type II errors are significantly higher than the standards prescribe for this sample
(p>0.0001). Figure 4 highlights the actual errors and error rates contained in the sample
from Audit Analytics. The sample includes the 283,219 firm-year observations available
in Audit Analytics. For the majority of surviving firms, auditors did not issue GCO
warnings. 82.35% of the firms in the overall sample were healthy firms with no error. In
addition, auditors correctly identified 1,514 firms as having uncertainty with respect to
going concern. 0.53% of the sample declared bankruptcy with warning. Although these
firms failed, this is not defined as an error because auditors appropriately warned
investors. In this study, firms failing after warnings are classified as Type III.
The sample includes 1,994 Type I errors where firms filed bankruptcy without
warning. For these firm-year observations, the audit firm failed to warn investors in the
audit of the annual report prior to a bankruptcy filing. Type I errors represent 0.69% of
the sample of all firms. The standard expects 100% of bankruptcies to be preceded by a
warning; however, out of 3,508 bankruptcies filed, 56.84% were not preceded by a GCO
warning.
The sample includes 46,539 Type II errors. For these firm-year observations, the
audit firm issued a GCO warning, but the firm did not file bankruptcy within one year.
Type II errors represent 16.43% of the sample.
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Unmodified Audit
Opinion in t

Modified Audit
Opinion in t

No Bankruptcy in t+1

Bankruptcy in t+1

No Error:

Type I Error:

233,222

1,994

Type II Error:

No Error:

46,539

1,514

Figure 4: Diagram of Actual GCOs, Type II Errors, and Type II Errors for Sample
Table 4.1 Panel A reports the sample of all firms by audit opinion indicators
reported in Audit Analytics by year from 1999 through 2016 with column 1 reporting the
number and percentage of firms with a clean GCO during the year, column 2 including
the number and percentage of firms with a GCO warning during the year, and column 3
reporting the total number of firms with audit opinions for each year. The sample for
period t includes 283,219 firm-year observations with 48,053 going concern warnings
issued.
Table 4.1 Panel B reports the sample by all firms with bankruptcy indicators
reported in Audit Analytics by year from 1999 through 2016 with column 1 reporting the
number and percentage of firms without a bankruptcy during year t+1, column 2
including the number and percentage of firms with a bankruptcies filing during year t+1,
and column 3 reporting the total number of firms with audit reports for each year. The
sample for period t includes 283,219 firm-year observations with 3,458 bankruptcies filed
from 2000 to 2017. I tested the relation between historic auditor’s judgement and actual
bankruptcies (untabulated). In each Pearson’s Chi-Square test, the relation between
historical auditors’ judgment and actual bankruptcies is statistically significant (at
P<0.001).
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Table 4.1 Number of Firms in Sample by Year
Panel A: Number
Panel B: Number of
of Firms with
Firms with Bankruptcies
GCO Opinions by
Filed by Year
Year
No
GCO
No
Bankruptcy
Year
GCO
Total
Issued Bankruptcy Filed in t+1
Issued
1999
7,536
1,574
8,875
325
9,110
2000
17,382
2,844
19,709
517
20,226
2001
15,925
3,018
18,571
372
18,943
2002
14,355
2,863
16,986
232
17,218
2003
15,137
2,590
17,573
154
17,727
2004
14,199
2,579
16,650
128
16,778
2005
14,252
2,738
16,843
147
16,990
2006
13,760
2,896
16,421
235
16,656
2007
13,378
3,328
16,391
315
16,706
2008
13,487
3,392
15,682
197
15,879
2009
12,542
3,137
15,546
133
15,679
2010
12,811
3,007
15,703
115
15,818
2011
12,518
2,581
15,096
101
15,199
2012
12,245
2,592
14,761
76
14,837
2013
12,136
2,436
14,470
102
14,572
2014
11,952
2,285
14,103
134
14,237
2015
11,452
2,141
13,472
121
13,593
2016
11,099
1,952
12,997
54
13,051
Total
235,166 48,053
279,761
3,458 283,219
Percentage 83.03% 16.97%
98.78%
1.22%
100%
Table 4.2 explores these errors by year. The significant Pearson’s Chi-Square
(p<0.001) indicates that there is a strong dependence between GCO opinions in t and
Bankruptcies in t+1. Bankruptcies are distributed throughout the sample period as
expected with a higher rate of bankruptcy in 2008-2010 as expected due to the 2008
recession.
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Table 4.2 Error Count by Error Type and Sample Year
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I:
Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
1999
7,314
79
1,471
246
9,110
2000
17,083
139
2,626
378
20,226
2001
15,725
64
2,845
308
18,943
2002
14,251
48
2,735
154
17,218
2003
15,057
23
2,516
131
17,727
2004
14,140
25
2,510
103
16,778
2005
14,174
21
2,669
126
16,990
2006
13,619
31
2,602
204
16,656
2007
13,179
66
3,212
248
16,706
2008
12,145
32
3,267
145
15,879
2009
12,484
11
3,062
122
15,679
2010
12,753
23
2,950
92
15,818
2011
12,465
23
2,633
78
15,199
2012
12,202
11
2,559
65
14,837
2013
12,071
12
2,399
89
14,572
2014
11,849
29
2,254
105
14,237
2015
11,360
47
2,104
74
13,593
2016
11,072
16
1,925
38
13,051
Total
233,222
699
46,539
2,759
283,219
Percentage 82.35%
0.25%
16.43%
0.98%
100%
Where Year is the fiscal year end. Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as
a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in
the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was
identified as a going concern, but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm
with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy
within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days
before a bankruptcy filing.
Year

There are several types of bankruptcy protection available to companies under
the current US Bankruptcy law. Chapter 7 is a straight liquidation, while Chapter 11
allows a firm to “reorganize” and continue operations. Some argue Chapter 11
bankruptcies do not require a GCO, as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy may be strategic.
Chapter 15 covers cases in which firms with US assets file bankruptcy internationally.
Table 4.3 examines the error rates among the type of bankruptcy filed. The relationship
between Type I errors and the type of bankruptcy filed is significant (p<0.001) using
Fisher’s exact testing. Auditors issued GCO warnings within the two years prior to
75.24% of the Chapter 7 bankruptcies and 65.73% of the Chapter II bankruptcies. By far,
the most common form of bankruptcy in my sample was Chapter 11. Type I and errors
were more likely for Chapter 11 firms than Chapter 7 firms. This may indicate that
auditors are making the distinction between strategic bankruptcies and straight
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liquidations. However, Chapter 7 firms may also be characterized by greater financial
distress and thus more accurate predictions can be made in advance. The source of this
discrepancy is beyond the scope of my study, but it could be addressed in future
research. The sample includes only twelve Chapter 15 bankruptcies. This subsample is
too small for further analysis.

Table 4.3 Comparison of Error Rates Based on the Type of Bankruptcy Filed
US
Type III:
Bankruptcy
Type I:
Total
No Error
Filing Type
Chapter 7
86
612
718
Chapter 11
608
2,119
2,727
Chapter 15
4
8
12
Unclassified
1
0
1
Total
699
2,759
3,458
Percentage
20.21%
79.79%
100%
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern,
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Other descriptive statistics about the sample highlight systematic differences
between firms with GCOs and/or subsequent bankruptcies. Table 4.4 reports the
number of days between the audit opinion and a subsequent bankruptcy by error type.
Firms with no bankruptcies report 365 by design. The mean number of days between the
firms with each kind of error is significantly different. On average bankruptcies that were
preceded by a warning were filed 171 after the date of the auditor’s report. Bankruptcies
filed without warning were, on average, filed 60 days later (mean 231 days after the
audit report). Bankruptcies that weren’t preceded by a warning occurred after a longer
delay from the previous audit report. This may indicate that GCOs expedite a firms’
bankruptcy under the “self-fulfilling prophecy” hypothesis, or it could indicate that
predictive accuracy decreases due to the information environment over time. Or, this
relationship may indicate that factors influencing a later bankruptcy may not have been
available at the time of an audit.
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Table 4.4 Mean Number of Days Between Auditor Report and Bankruptcy Filing
Panel A: Number of Days between Date of Audit Report and Bankruptcy Filing Date
Error Type

Number
of Firms

Number of Days until Bankruptcy Filing
Standard
Mean
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
231.07
90.13
1
355
171.05
103.81
0
355

Type I
699
Type III: No Error
961
(bankruptcy in t+1)
Type III: No Error
1,798 543.15
107.58
356.00
(bankruptcy in t+2)
Panel B: Number of Days between Year End and Bankruptcy Filing Date
Error Type

Number
of Firms

730

Number of Days until Bankruptcy Filing
Standard
Mean
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
346.77
134.54
70
355
267.36
129.52
77
355

Type I
699
Type III: No Error
961
(bankruptcy in t+1)
Type III: No Error
1,798 554.52
136.65
426
730
(bankruptcy in t+2)
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern,
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
I divided the sample by CIK industry classification to analyze the potential impact
from a concentration of firms in the financial industry. Tables 4.5 provides descriptive
statistics comparing the sample of financial firms to non-financial firms. This table
highlights that both Type I and Type II errors are less likely for financial firms. There are
39,728 financial firms in the sample with 312 bankruptcies and 5,905 GCOs. I identify 65
Type I errors and 5,788 Type II errors. The Pearson’s Chi Square test is significant
(p<0.001) for firm type and both going concern opinions and bankruptcies, so sensitive
testing is planned. This analysis is necessary to highlight any concentration during the
2008 financial crisis particularly due to “Too Big to Fail” policies at that time. I conclude
that removing financial firms from my sample is not necessary.
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Table 4.5 Comparison of Error Types within a Subsample of Firms in the Financial
Industry
Type 0:
No Error
39,726

Type I:

Type II:

Type III:
No Error
247

Total

Financial
65
5,788
45,826
Firms
Non-Financial
194,114
634
40,751
2,512
238,011
Firms
Total
233,842
699
46,539
2,759
283,839
Percentage
82.39% 0.25%
16.40%
0.97%
100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
When setting the level for planning materiality, auditors use several rules-ofthumb. Common thresholds for planning materiality include: five percent of earnings
before taxes (EBIT), one percent of EBIT, 0.3 percent of total assets, 0.5 percent of total
assets, or one percent of retained earnings. Table 4.6 describes the mean of each of
these five thresholds for the historical sample. Panel A highlights the mean difference
between the quantitative thresholds for surviving entities versus entities with subsequent
bankruptcies. Note that the mean RE for bankrupt firms is negative and all planned
quantitative materiality thresholds for firms with subsequent bankruptcies are less than
that planned for firms without subsequent bankruptcies. In Panel B, note that firms with
Chapter 7 bankruptcies have lower quantitative thresholds than those with Chapter 11
bankruptcies when determined based on EBI or Total Assets. These differences in
underlying fundamentals may drive the performance of certain bankruptcy models in the
audit environment.
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Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics for Common Materiality Thresholds by Bankruptcy
Indicator and Type
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Materiality Thresholds by Bankruptcy Indicator
Number
Bankruptcy
of
Indicator
Firms

0

1

51,976

493

Materiality Threshold

Mean

5% of EBIT
1% of EBIT
0.3% of Total Assets
0.5% of Total Assets
1% of Retained
Earnings
5% of EBIT
1% of EBIT
0.3% of Total Assets
0.5% of Total Assets
1% of Retained
Earnings

11.96
2.39
14.73
24.56
5.05

Lowers
95% CL
for
Mean
11.72
2.34
14.47
24.12
4.91

1.41
0.28
6.73
11.22
-2.07

0.58
0.12
5.27
8.78
-2.63
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Upper
95% CL
of Mean

Standard
Deviation

12.20
2.44
15.00
24.99
5.18

25.82
5.16
30.35
50.59
15.32

2.24
0.45
8.19
13.65
-1.50

9.16
1.83
16.51
27.52
6.29

Table 4.6 (continued)
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Materiality Thresholds by Bankruptcy Type
Bankruptcy
Type

Number
of
Firms

Materiality
Threshold

Mean

Lowers
95% CL
for
Mean
-0.74
-0.15
0.11

Upper
95% CL
of Mean

Standard
Deviation

5% of EBIT
-0.45
-0.15
1.23
1% of EBIT
-0.09
-0.03
0.25
0.3% of Total
0.40
0.68
1.24
Assets
Chapter 7
74
0.5% of Total
0.66
0.18
1.14
2.06
Assets
1% of Retained
-1.16
-1.84
-0.47
2.98
Earnings
5% of EBIT
1.29
0.48
2.10
8.73
1% of EBIT
0.26
0.10
0.42
1.75
0.3% of Total
6.89
5.50
8.28
15.37
Assets
Chapter 11
472
0.5% of Total
11.48
9.17
13.80
25.62
Assets
1% of Retained
-2.06
-2.66
-1.46
6.47
Earnings
5% of EBIT
20.19
-6.07
46.45
25.03
1% of EBIT
4.04
-1.21
9.29
5.01
0.3% of Total
50.24
-2.42
102.9
50.19
Assets
Chapter 15
6
0.5% of Total
83.74
4.04
171.5
83.64
Assets
1% of Retained
-3.40
-6.48
-0.32
2.93
Earnings
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date.
4.2

Part 1. Model Simulations
I collect all accounting variables required for Z-Score, O-Score, Shumway Score,

and the Merton KMV’s Distance to Default calculation from the Compustat annual file.
Audit Analytics identified the issuance of a going concern opinion as a “1” in the indicator
variable “GCO”. After matching on the Central Index Key (CIK), my sample includes
45,828 financial firm-year observations from Audit Analytics. I identify 5,905 companies
with a modified audit report for going concern (GCO) in t and 312 companies with
bankruptcies in t+1. The pattern of bankruptcies by year was similar to that of the overall
sample, with higher filing rates near 2001 and 2008.
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4.2.1

Z-Score Testing.
I collect the variables needed to calculate each determinant of Altman’s Z-Score

from Compustat North America Daily - Fundamentals Annual dataset from 1999 through
2016. I match the variable to my sample from Audit Analytics. The matched sample
includes 89,755 firm-year observations with adequate data availability that include 2,456
bankruptcies and 15,950 modified going concern opinions. Table 4.7 includes
descriptive statistics for the determinant variables of Altmans Z-Score, Winsorized at 1%
to limit the effect of outliers in the Compustat data. The descriptive statistics highlight the
absence of data for some observations. Observations with incomplete data for each
model are dropped from the sample when testing that model only.
Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables of Z-Score Model
Standard
Minimum
Median
Maximum
Deviation
AT
142,386 7,306.55 30,282.76
0.02
440.30 248,437.00
ACT
101,937
831.62
2,563.05
0.00
86.84
19,023.00
LT
142,386 5,613.93 24,913.83
0.08
249.33 209,886.00
LCT
102,394
621.54
2,067.37
0.04
38.52
15,347.82
WCAP
101,073
197.17
719.33 -1,489.72
21.93
4,939.46
CSHO
142,386
90.80
249.69
0.00
21.20
1,884.31
SALE
123,456 2,144.72
6,845.84
0.00
145.07
49,964.80
OIADP
123,454
283.97
1,034.22
-209.00
9.84
7,876.94
EBIT
122,810
284.39
1,034.83
-209.78
9.83
7,877.00
RE
138,988
635.06
2,980.63 -2,803.46
3.96
22,632.00
PRCC_F
130,202
36.01
1,199.49
0.00
11.86 141,600.00
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT
indicating total assets, ACT indicating total current assets, LT is total liabilities, WCAP is
working capital, CSHO is the number of common shares outstanding, SALE is total
revenue, OIADP is operating income before amortization and depreciation, EBIT is
earnings before interest and taxes, RE is retained earnings, and PRCC_F is the price
per share of common stock at the end of the fiscal year. N is the number of firm-level
observations.
Variable

N

Mean

Following literature, I use three models of the Altman Z-Score to estimate the
probability of bankruptcy. I calculate the Z-Score according to the specifications in
Altman (1968), Altman et al. (1993), and Hillegeist et al. (2004). Table 4.8 reports the
means of Altman’s Z-Score for each model. Panel A compares the sample of firms with
bankruptcies in t+1 to all other firms. As expected, for each model, the mean Z-Scores
for firms with bankruptcies is significantly smaller than the Z-Score for surviving firms.
Panel B compares the sample of firms with going concern opinions in t to firms all other
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firms. Note the mean Z-Score for the going concern sub-sample using equation 1 and 2
are significantly lower than the “healthy” firms, as expected. However, the mean Z-Score
for GCO firms using the Hillegeist (2004) model in equation 3 is higher than the nonGCO firms. Testing the reason behind this surprising result is beyond the scope of my
dissertation, but it could indicate that auditors’ predictions fail to incorporate changes in
bankruptcy regulation in the 2004 model.

Table 4.8 Descriptive Means of Z-Score Models - Equations 1-3
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Z-Scores for all Firms in Sample
Standard
Minimum
Median
Deviation
Altz
88,955
-6.18
65.45
-533.25
2.53
Altz93
88,955
-21.38
162.83
-1,346.52
3.33
Altz04
88,955
7.06
8.27
4.16
4.89
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Z-Scores by Bankruptcy Indicator
Variable

Bankruptcy
Indicator

N

Mean

Variable

Standard
Deviation
65.75
163.56

Median

Maximum

-533.25
0
1,346.52
Altz04
86,980
7.10
8.33
4.16
Altz
1,975
-9.86
50.36
-533.25
Altz93
1,975 -28.20
126.68
1
1,346.52
Altz04
1,975
5.35
4.25
4.16
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Z-Scores by GCO Indicator

2.59
3.45

107.56
185.38

4.91
-0.12
-3.07

70.31
107.56
185.38

4.41

70.31

Median

Maximum

GCO
Indicator

Variable

86,980
-6.10
86,980 -21.22

N
75,465
75,465
75,465
13,490
13,490

Mean

Standard
Minimum
Deviation
21.04
-533.25
47.67 -1,346.52
6.23
4.16
146.89
-533.25
366.97 -1,346.52

4.48
2.96
107.56
5.91
4.17
185.38
6.41
4.86
70.31
-65.82
-9.48
107.56
-27.16
185.38
1
174.02
Altz04
13,490
10.73
14.74
4.16
5.33
70.31
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report.
0

Altz
Altz93
Altz04
Altz
Altz93

Mean

107.56
185.38
70.31

Minimum

Altz
Altz93

N

Maximum

I test the appropriateness of using a bright-line test based on BPMs as a
substitute for auditors’ judgment to identify firms with going concern uncertainty during
the planning stages of an audit. I again use three models of the Altman Z-Score to
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estimate the probability of bankruptcy. The results of testing are summarized in Table
4.9. A sample of 142,386 firms had sufficient data to calculate Z-Scores. A classifies
sample firms based on historic GCO warnings and bankruptcies filed. Auditor judgment
resulted in appropriate predictions for 88.47% of firm observations with 1,466 (1.03%)
Type I errors and 14,946 (10.50%) Type II errors reported.
Table 4.9 Panel B reports the error rates that would result if equations 1-3 had
been used in place of auditor judgment. For the classic model (equation 1) the bright-line
test is defined by any score less than 1.8 substitutes for auditor judgment as a predicted
bankruptcy in period t+1. Using the classic cut-off definition of Z-Score<1.8 as a brightline test resulted in the greatest number of GCO warnings issued prior to a bankruptcy
(2,456, 84.25%) which is significantly better than auditor’s predictions (987, 40.19%).
Therefore, Type I error rates were 3.8 times higher for bankrupt firms based on auditor
judgments. If the only goal of auditors was to predict bankruptcies, a bright-line test
based on the classic Z-Score appears to outperform auditor judgment; however, there
were significantly more Type II errors using the bright-line test in Panel A (87,726)
compared to historical errors (14,963).
For robustness I also tested the original model and two re-estimated models
(equation 2 and 3) and use probability of bankruptcy > 50% and 70% as a bright-line
tests to substitute for auditor judgment. Each model resulted in a similar tradeoff
between Type I and Type II errors when evaluated by count and rate. Because the cost
of each type of error and each bankruptcy is not equal to stakeholders, evaluating the
usefulness of each model requires cost trade-off analysis between Type I and Type II
errors. The results based on count do not address whether the costliest bankruptcies
were predicted by auditor judgment for a specified model.
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Table 4.9 Results from Bright-Line Testing of Z-Score Models
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
Going Concern Opinions
124,989
1,466
14,946
985
142,386
Percentage
87.78% 1.03%
10.50%
0.69% 100.00%
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment
Auditor Judgment

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
1968 Z-Score with Classic Threshold
53,066
386
86,869
2,065
142,386
37.27% 0.27%
61.01%
1.45% 100.00%
1968 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.5)
71,309
1,497
68,626
954
142,386
50.08% 1.05%
48.20%
0.67% 100.00%
1993 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.5)
76,015
1,847
63,920
604
142,386
53.39% 1.30%
44.89%
0.42% 100.00%
1993 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.7)
75,547
1,830
64,388
621
142,386
53.06% 1.29%
45.22%
0.44% 100.00%
2004 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.5)
52,955
476
86,980
1,975
142,386
37.19% 0.33%
61.09%
1.39% 100.00%
2004 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.7)
71,309
1,497
66,626
954
142,386
50.08% 1.05%
48.20%
0.67% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Bright-Line Test

Because many of the Chapter 11 bankruptcies in the overall sample may be
strategic, these types of bankruptcies might not be prewarned in financial fundamentals
and some have argued that strategic bankruptcy filings do not represent going concern
uncertainty. Chapter 7 bankruptcies, however, do meet the standard definition of going
concern uncertainty. Table 4.10 examines the use of bright line testing to limit Type I
errors by bankruptcy type. Auditors issued GCOs before 259 of the Chapter 7
bankruptcies (untabulated). The bright-line test using the classic 1.8 threshold would
have predicted 382. The difference between the Type I error count for auditor judgment
versus (195) the classic Z-Score model (72) for Chapter 7 bankruptcies is significant
(p<0.001), but doesn’t address the relative market cost given firm characteristics.
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Table 4.10 Simulated Error Count Using Z-Score Classic Model for Bright-Line Test by
Bankruptcy Type
Type III:
Total
No Error
Chapter 7
72
382
454
15.86%
84.14% 100.00%
Chapter 11
314
1,672
1,986
15.81%
84.19% 100.00%
Chapter 15
0
10
10
0%
100% 100.00%
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern,
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Bankruptcy Type

Type I:

I include a Pearson’s Correlation matrix in Table 4.11 for each BPM specification
against actual bankruptcies in t+1. As expected, each model is significantly predictive.
The correlation coefficient between Bankruptcy Indicator and GCO Indicator (0.1218) is
larger than between Bankruptcy Indicator and any of the tested Z-Score models. This
suggests that auditor judgment outperforms the scores for bankruptcy prediction.
Table 4.11 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings

Variable

Bankruptcy
Indicator

GCO
Indicator

1968 ZScore
Classic
Indicator

1968 ZScore
(p>0.5)
Indicator

1993 ZScore
(p>0.5)
Indicator

2004 ZScore
(p>0.5)
Indicator

Bankruptcy
1.0000
Indicator
GCO
0.1218
1.0000
Indicator
<0.0001
1968 Z-Score
0.0596
0.1810
Classic
1.0000
<0.0001
<0.0001
Indicator
1968 Z-Score
-0.0263
-0.2061 -0.7930
(p>0.5)
1.0000
<0.0001
<0.0001 <0.0001
Indicator
1993 Z-Score
-0.0550
-0.2264 -0.8252
0.92724
(p>0.5)
1.0000
<0.0001
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Indicator
2004 Z-Score
0.0495
0.1628
-0.6008
0.7577
0.7055
(p>0.5)
1.0000
<0.0001
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
<0.0001
Indicator
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report. Model specifications and variable definitions are
provided in equations 1-3.
59

This dissertation questions whether it is appropriate to use bright-line tests in the
planning stage of an audit. This is a unique environment because auditors must consider
the impact of planning materiality when performing analytical procedures. I simulate the
risk-based auditing environment by transforming the accounting fundamentals for
individual companies to reflect negative news at common materiality thresholds4.
I test five alternatives for quantitative materiality thresholds that could be used
during audit planning. I manipulate the accounting fundamentals of each company to
reflect negative news within five common materiality thresholds. The five levels of
planning materiality simulated or each type of misstatement include (1) five percent of
earnings before taxes (hereafter, EBIT), (2) one percent of EBIT, (3) 0.3 percent of total
assets, (4) 0.5 percent of total assets, and (5) one percent of retained earnings. In
analyzing the results, I am aware that different thresholds for planning materiality are
used to evaluate balance sheet and income statement items. A percentage of EBIT (1
and 2) is used to evaluate misstated sales (A), where a percentage of total assets (3 and
4) is used to evaluate misstated assets and liabilities (B through E). Furthermore,
quantitative materiality thresholds are often set at 5% of net income as a rule-of-thumb in
practice; however, research suggests that this threshold is set lower for companies that
show weak earnings.
I simulated the performance of bright-line testing using (1) the Altman’s (1968) ZScore model and the classic threshold of Z-Score < 1.8 as a proxy for default and (2) the
Hillegeist et al. (2004) Z-Score with the threshold probability of default at 50%. For each
model, I simulated twenty-five errors: the combination of errors at five levels of planning
materiality and five types of misstatements tested include simulations where (A) net
sales are overstated, (B) long-term assets are overstated, (C) current assets are
overstated, (D) long-term liabilities are understated, and (E) current liabilities are
understated. Table 4.12 presents the results of the simulations. Panel A includes the
simulation results using the 1968 classic definition of Z-Score. Panel B reports the
results from the 2004 re-estimation.

4

Preliminary analysis of $1 less than the materiality threshold or 99.99% of the materiality threshold
indicated that BPM analysis is not sensitive to this cut off.
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Table 4.12 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using Z-Score Model in a
Simulated Audit Planning Environment
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated
Overstatements in Sales
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
87,028
2,057
52,907
394
61.12% 1.44%
37.16%
0.28%
1% of EBIT
87,072
2,064
52,863
387
61.15% 1.45%
37.13%
0.27%
0.3% of TA
87,312
2,072
52,623
379
61.32%
379%
36.96%
0.27%
0.5% of TA
87,457
2,073
52,478
378
61.42% 1.46%
36.86%
0.27%
1% of RE
86,950
2,062
52,985
389
61.07% 1.45%
37.21%
0.27%
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated
Overstatement in Long-term Assets
Materiality Threshold

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
96,951
1,528
42,984
923
68.09% 1.07%
30.19%
0.65%
1% of EBIT
9,943
1,829
46,992
622
65.28% 1.28%
33.00%
0.44%
0.3% of TA
106,182
2,186
33,753
265
74.57% 1.54%
23.71%
0.19%
0.5% of TA
109,583
2,214
30,652
237
76.96% 1.55%
21.32%
0.17%
1% of RE
139,935
2,451
0
0
98.28% 1.72%
0.00%
0.00%
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated
Overstatement in Current Assets
Materiality Threshold

Materiality Threshold
5% of EBIT
1% of EBIT
0.3% of TA
0.5% of TA
1% of RE

Type 0:
Type I:
No Error
96,939
1,524
68.08% 1.07%
92,947
1,829
65.28% 1.28%
106,212
2,186
74.59% 1.54%
109,623
2,215
76.99% 1.56%
94,515
1,702
66.38% 1.20%
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Type II:
42,996
30.20%
46,988
33.00%
33,723
23.68%
30,312
21.29%
45,420
31.90%

Type III:
No Error
927
0.65%
622
0.44%
265
0.19%
236
0.17%
749
0.53%

Total
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%

Total
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%

Total
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%

Table 4.12 (continued)
Panel D: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated
Understatement in Long-Term Liabilities
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
86,843
2,050
53,092
401
60.99% 1.44%
37.29%
0.28%
1% of EBIT
87,003
2,066
52,932
385
61.10% 1.45%
37.18%
0.27%
0.3% of TA
87,196
2,066
52,739
385
61.24% 1.45%
37.04%
0.27%
0.5% of TA
87,259
2,066
52,676
385
61.28% 1.45%
37.00%
0.27%
1% of RE
86,805
2,059
53,130
392
60.96% 1.45%
37.31%
0.28%
Panel E: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated
Understatement in Current Liabilities
Materiality Threshold

Total
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%
142,386
100.00%

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
86,834
2,048
53,101
403
142,386
60.98% 1.44%
37.29%
0.28% 100.00%
1% of EBIT
87,004
2,066
52,931
385
142,386
61.10% 1.45%
37.17%
0.27% 100.00%
0.3% of TA
87,245
2,068
52,690
383
142,386
61.27% 1.45%
37.01%
0.27% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
87,337
2,068
52,598
383
142,386
61.34% 1.45%
36.94%
0.27% 100.00%
1% of RE
86,793
2,060
53,142
391
142,386
60.96% 1.45%
37.32%
0.27% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is
total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained earnings.
Materiality Threshold

Informed by the performance of bright-line testing in Table 4.9. I selected the
2004 Z-Score Model as a sensitivity test for discriminate analysis models. I repeated the
test simulations from Table 4.12 with the 2004 specification (equation 3) of the Z-Score
model. The results appear in Table 4.13. The pattern suggests that this model fails to
correctly predict bankruptcies given relatively small changes in accounting
fundamentals. Auditors using this model as an analytical procedure in the planning stage
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of the audit would identify fewer Type II errors, but would also fail to identify almost all
bankruptcies.
Table 4.13 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Testing using the 2004 Z-Score
Model in a Simulated Audit Planning Environment
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatements in
Sales
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of EBIT
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
0.3% of TA
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of RE
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatement in
Long-term Assets
Materiality Threshold

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
86,929
1,975
51
0
88,955
97.72% 2.22%
0.06%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of EBIT
86,917
1,975
63
0
88,955
97.71% 2.22%
0.07%
0.00% 100.00%
0.3% of TA
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
86,879
1,975
101
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of RE
86,924
1,975
56
0
88,955
97.72% 2.22%
0.06%
0.00% 100.00%
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatement in
Current Assets
Materiality Threshold

Materiality Threshold
5% of EBIT
1% of EBIT
0.3% of TA
0.5% of TA
1% of RE

Type 0:
Type I:
No Error
86,930
1,975
97.72% 2.22%
86,917
1,975
97.71% 2.22%
86,879
1,975
97.67% 2.22%
86,879
1,975
97.67% 2.22%
86,924
1,975
97.72% 2.22%
63

Type II:
50
0.06%
63
0.07%
101
0.11%
101
0.11%
56
0.06%

Type III:
No Error
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%

Total
88,955
100.00%
88,955
100.00%
88,955
100.00%
88,955
100.00%
88,955
100.00%

Table 4.13 (continued)
Panel D: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Understatement in
Long-Term Liabilities
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
86,558
1,972
422
3
88,955
97.31% 2.22%
0.47%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of EBIT
86,862
1,975
118
0
88,955
97,65% 2.22%
0.13%
0.00% 100.00%
0.3% of TA
86,883
1,975
97
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
85,883
1,975
97
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of RE
86,217
1,965
763
10
88,955
95.92% 2.21%
0.86%
0.01% 100.00%
Panel E: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Understatement in
Current Liabilities
Materiality Threshold

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
86,562
1,972
418
3
88,955
97.31% 2.22%
0.47%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of EBIT
86,863
1,975
117
0
88,955
97.65% 2.22%
0.13%
0.00% 100.00%
0.3% of TA
86,883
1,975
97
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
86,883
1,975
97
0
88,955
97.67% 2.22%
0.11%
0.00% 100.00%
1% of RE
86,221
1,965
759
10
88,955
96.93% 2.21%
0.85%
0.01% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is
total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained earnings.
Materiality Threshold

Note that the classic Z-Score model appears more sensitive to misstated assets.
Overall, the 2004 model and the probability>0.5 test appear less sensitive to
misstatements at the level of planning materiality and more stable in the audit
environment. However, this bright-line test also results in substantially more Type II
errors, as noted previously. The 2004 Z-Score model appears to be sensitive to errors
that auditors may consider immaterial during the planning stage of the audit. Table 5.3Panel D reports 474 Type I errors with the 2004 O-Score model used as a bright-line test
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in audit planning. The simulations demonstrate that a misstatement at the level of
planning materiality could result in between 474 and 2,456 Type I errors using this model
as a bright-line test. Type II errors would decrease from 87,743 to between 54,468 and
87,244. This may indicate that these levels for planning materiality are inappropriately
large if the O-Score is used a bright-line test for going concern.
4.2.2

O-ScoreTesting.
I collect the variables needed to calculate each determinant of Ohlson’s O-Score

specified in equation 5 and 6 from Compustat North America Daily - Fundamentals
Annual dataset from 1999 through 2016. I match the variable to my sample from Audit
Analytics. I define X6 as an indicator variable when the cumulative net income over the
previous two years is negative and X8 as an indicator variable equal to one if owners’
equity is negative. The matched sample includes 142,784 firm-year observations with
adequate data availability that include 2,098 bankruptcies and 14,417 modified going
concern opinions. Table 4.14 includes descriptive statistics for the determinant variables
of Ohlson’s O-Score, Winsorized at 1% to limit the effect of outliers in the Compustat
data.

Table 4.14 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables in O-Score Models –
Equations 4-5
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in O-Scores for all Firms in Sample
Variable
AT
ACT
LT
LCT

N

Mean

142,784
102,232
142,784
102,687

13,516.45
1,029.53
11,618.56
813.47

Standard
Deviation
112,235.96
4,797.65
105,587.11
4,521.89

Minimum

Median

Maximum

0.00
441.52 3,771,199.85
-0.17
86.84
161,978.00
0.00
249.90 3,589,783.24
38.57
329,795.00
43,132.55
WCAP
101,368
224.30
1,713.09
21.87
88,652.00
99,289.00
NI
123,796
163.98
1,446.50
2.63
104,821.00
80,053.00
EBIT
123,150
381.12
2,382.41
-9.35
4.59
130,622
Oscore
29,206
-5.61
26.51
-182.98
0.47
9.53
Oscore04
29,206
6.32
2.57
0.33
6.54
19.74
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is
total assets, ACT indicating total current assets, LT is total liabilities, LCT is total current
liabilities, WCAP is working capital, NI is net income, EBIT is earnings before interest
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and taxes, Oscore is the result of equation 5, and Oscore04 is the result of equation 6. N
is the number of firm-level observations.
Table 4.15 reports the mean of Ohlson’s O-Score for each model. Panel A
compares the sample of firms with bankruptcies in t+1 to all other firms. Panel B
compares the sample of firms with going concern opinions in t to firms all other firms.
Note that, as expected, the mean O-Score for both bankrupt and going concern samples
is lower than the mean for surviving firms and those with unmodified opinions. However,
using the 2004 re-estimated model shows that the average O-Score for firms with GCOs
is higher than the non-GCO firms. In all cases, the standard deviation of the means for
bankrupt or GCO firms is larger.

Table 4.15 Decriptve Means of O-Score Models - Equations 4-5Panel A: Descriptive
Statistics for O-Scores by Bankruptcy Indicator
Bankruptcy
Indicator

Standard
Minimum
Deviation
Oscore
28,581 -5.61
26.70
-182.98
0
Oscore04 28,581
6.35
2.57
0.33
Oscore
625 -5.26
15.53
-182.98
1
Oscore04
625
5.24
2.42
0.33
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for O-Scores by GCO Indicator
GCO
Indicator

Variable

N

Mean

Median

Maximum

0.53
6.55
-2.22
4.71

9.53
19.74
9.53
19.74

Standard
Minimum Median Maximum
Deviation
Oscore
24,789
0.15
8.45
-182.98
1.12
9.53
0
Oscore04 24,789
6.11
1.84
0.33
6.55
19.74
Oscore
4,417 -37.89
54.96
-182.98
-13.13
9.53
1
Oscore04
4,417
7.54
4.80
0.33
5.86
19.74
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report. Oscore is the result of equation 5, and Oscore04 is the
result of equation 6. N is the number of firm-level observations.
Variable

N

Mean

I test the appropriateness of using a bright-line test based on BPMs as a
substitute for auditors’ judgment to identify firms with going concern uncertainty during
the planning stages of an audit. Following Hillegeist et al. 2004, I test two O-Score
models to estimate the probability of bankruptcy. I test the original model (equation 4)
and the 2004 re-estimated model (equation 5) and use probability of bankruptcy > 50%
and 70% as a bright-line tests to substitute for auditor judgment.
Table 4.16 reports the error rates of each model. Using the more-likely-than-not
definition (where the probability of default is estimated to be greater than 50%) as a
66

bright-line test or the 2004 O-Score model resulted in the greatest number of GCO
warnings issued prior to a bankruptcy (2,093, 85.22%) which is significantly better than
auditor’s predictions (987, 40.19%). Type I error rates were 3.8 times higher for bankrupt
firms based on auditor judgments. If the only goal of auditors was to predict
bankruptcies, the bright-line test in Panels B and D would appear to be a clear winner;
however, there were significantly more Type II errors using the bright-line test in for OScore in Panel B (93,393) compared to historical errors (14,981). Overall, auditors
predicted 15,968 bankruptcies and were correct 6.18% of the time. The Bright-line test in
Panel B predicted 95,486 bankruptcies and was correct 2.19% of the time. The Brightline test in Panel D predicted 95,466 bankruptcies and was correct 2.19% of the time.
Evaluating the usefulness of each test requires cost trade-off analysis between Type I
and Type II errors.
Table 4.16 Results of Bright-Line Testing of O-Score Models
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
Going Concern Opinions
125,347
1,469
14,981
987
142,784
Percentage
87.79% 1.03%
10.49%
0.69% 100.00%
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment
Auditor Judgment

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
1980 O-Score with Probability
124,530
2,307
15,798
149
142,784
(p>0.5)
87.22% 1.62%
11.06%
0.10% 100.00%
1980 O-Score with Probability
127,011
2,348
13,317
108
142,784
(p>0.7)
88.95% 1.64%
9.33%
0.05% 100.00%
2004 O-Score with Probability
111,747
1,831
28,581
625
142,784
(p>0.5)
78.26% 1.28%
20.02%
0.44% 100.00%
2004 O-Score with Probability
112,085
1,837
28,243
819
142,784
(p>0.7)
78.50% 1.29%
19.78%
0.43% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Bright-Line Test

The sample contains 1,991 Chapter 11 bankruptcies that may be strategic and
not proxy for a failing firm. Table 4.17 examines the use of bright line testing for the 454
Chapter 7 bankruptcies included in the sample. Auditors using the bright-line test with
the 2004 O-Score Model (Equation 5) would have identified 370 (81.50%) of these
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bankruptcies prior to filing. Using the bright-line test limited Type I errors to 18.50% for
Chapter 7 bankruptcies. This is significantly fewer Type I errors than using historic GCO
(195, 42.95%).

Table 4.17 Simulated Error Count Using O-Score Classic Model for Bright-Line Test by
Bankruptcy Type
Type III:
Total
No Error
Chapter 7
195
259
454
42.95%
57.05% 100.00%
Chapter 11
1,254
727
1991
63.49%
35.51% 100.00%
Chapter 15
9
1
10
90.00%
10.00% 100.00%
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern,
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Bankruptcy Type

Type I:

I include a Pearson’s Correlation matrix in Table 4.17 of each BPM against actual
bankruptcies in t+1. As expected, each model is significantly predictive. The correlation
coefficient is higher between the bankruptcy indicator and auditors going concern
opinions than the tested O-Score models. This suggests that auditor judgment
outperforms the scores for bankruptcy prediction.
Table 4.18 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings
Variable

1980 O2004 OBankruptcy
GCO
Score(p>0.5) Score(p>0.5)
Indicator
Indicator
Indicator
Indicator

Bankruptcy
1.00000
Indicator
GCO
0.12175
1.00000
Indicator
<0.0001
1980 O-0.02269
Score(p>0.5)
0.10114
1.00000
<0.0001
Indicator
<0.0001
2004 O0.01644
0.05382
0.63949
Score(p>0.5)
1.00000
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
Indicator
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report. Model specifications and variable definitions are
provided in equations 4-5.
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Next, I simulated the risk-based auditing environment by transforming the
accounting fundamentals for individual companies to reflect negative news at common
materiality thresholds.
I simulated the performance of bright-line testing using the 2004 O-Score model
with the threshold probability of default at 50%. The five types of misstatements tested
include simulations where (A) net sales are overstated, (B) long-term assets are
overstated, (C) current assets are overstated, (D) long-term liabilities are understated,
and (E) current liabilities are understated. I manipulate the accounting fundamentals of
the companies to reflect negative news within five common materiality thresholds. The
five levels of planning materiality simulated or each type of misstatement include (1) five
percent of earnings before taxes (EBIT), (2) one percent of EBIT, (3) 0.3 percent of total
assets, (4) 0.5% of total assets, and (5) one percent of retained earnings. I simulated
five errors at five levels of planning materiality. In analyzing the results, I limited inclusion
based on the general use of EBIT-based materiality thresholds to audit income
statement items and asset-based thresholds to audit balance sheet items. The fifteen
most relevant simulations follow in Table 4.18.

Table 4.19 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using O-Score Models in a
Simulated Audit Planning Environment
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatements in
Sales
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
112,250
1,835
28,058
621
78.62% 1.29%
19.66%
0.43%
1% of EBIT
112,236
1,837
28,092
619
78.61% 1.29%
19.67%
0.43%
1% of RE
112,957
1,842
27,341
614
79.13% 1.29%
19.15%
0.43%
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Classic Model Given Simulated
Overstatement in Long-term Assets
Materiality Threshold

Materiality Threshold
0.3% of TA
0.5% of TA
1% of RE

Type 0:
Type I:
No Error
113,005
1,842
79.14% 1.29%
113,036
1,842
79.14% 1.29%
112,950
1,842
79.13% 1.29%
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Type II:
27,323
19.14%
27,322
19.14%
27,348
19.15%

Type III:
No Error
614
0.43%
614
0.43%
614
0.43%

Total
142,784
100.00%
142,784
100.00%
142,784
100.00%

Total
142,784
100.00%
142,784
100.00%
142,784
100.00%

Table 4.19 (continued)
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatement in
Current Assets
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
0.3% of TA
112,942
1,841
27,386
615
142,784
79.10% 1.29%
19.18%
0.43% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
112,971
1,841
27,357
615
142,784
79.12% 1.29%
19.16%
0.43% 100.00%
1% of RE
112,405
1,840
27,923
616
142,784
78.72% 1.29%
19.56%
0.43% 100.00%
Panel D: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Classic l Given Simulated Understatement
in Long-Term Liabilities
Materiality Threshold

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
0.3% of TA
112,876
1,841
27,452
615
142,784
79.05% 1.29%
19.23%
0.43% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
112,876
1,841
27,452
615
142,784
79.05% 1.29%
19.23%
0.43% 100.00%
1% of RE
112,942
1,842
27,356
614
142,784
79.10% 1.29%
19.18%
0.43% 100.00%
Panel E: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Model Given Simulated Understatement in
Current Liabilities
Materiality Threshold

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
0.3% of TA
112,851
1,841
27,447
615
142,784
79.06% 1.29%
19.22%
0.43% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
112,822
1,841
27,506
615
142,784
79.02% 1.29%
19.26%
0.43% 100.00%
1% of RE
113,445
1,847
26,883
609
142,784
79.45% 1.29%
18.83%
0.43% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT
indicates total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained
earnings.
Materiality Threshold

The 2004 O-Score model appears to be sensitive to errors that auditors may
consider immaterial during the planning stage of the audit. Table 4.19-Panel B reports
363 Type I errors with the 2004 O-Score model used as a bright-line test in audit
planning. The simulations demonstrate that a misstatement at the level of planning
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materiality would result in 375-433 Type I errors using this bright-line test. Type II errors
would decrease from 93,393 to between 84,909 and 88,337. This may indicate that
these levels for planning materiality are inappropriately large if the O-Score is used a
bright-line test for going concern.
4.2.3

Hazard Model Testing.
The Shumway Hazard model required data from Compustat North American

Daily – Fundamentals Annual dataset and the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Stock/Security Files. I calculated all scores then matched the scores to my
sample from Audit Analytics. The matched sample includes 53,043 firm-year
observations with adequate data availability that include 963 bankruptcies and 2,046
modified going concern opinions. Table 4.20 includes descriptive statistics for the
determinant variables for Shumway’s Hazard model (Windsorized at 1%). Panel A
highlights the difference in variable means by error type. Firms with going concern
indicators were smaller with a mean net loss. Note that the probability of default is higher
for bankrupt and GCO firms, as expected. The mean probability of default for bankrupt
firms with GCO warnings is 43%. Bankrupt firms with GCO warnings had the smallest
mean assets and the largest mean loss of any group, as expected.

Table 4.20 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables of Shumway Model –
Equation 6
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Shumway for all Firms in Sample
Standard
Minimum
Median
Deviation
AT
50,043
4,752.86 18,632.88
5.02
398.61
LT
50,043
3,185.14 12,905.69
0.89
191.24
NI
50,043
135.66
578.07
-642.37
6.25
PRCC_F
50,043
19.24
18.94
0.27
13.62
CSHO
50,043
100.88
260.74
1.47
27.30
sigma
50,043
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.03
shumway
50,043
0.03
0.14
0.00
0.00
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Shumway by Bankruptcy Indicator
Variable

N

Bankruptcy
Variable
Indicator
0
Shumway
1
Shumway

Mean

N
52,080
963

Standard
Minimum
Deviation
0.03
0.13
0.03
0.24
0.36
0.00

Mean
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Maximum
161,165.00
111,881.00
4295.30
94.00
1,884.31
1.21
1.00

Median

Maximum

0.00
0.04

1.00
1.00

Table 4.20 (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Shumway by GCO Indicator
GCO
Standard
Variable
N
Mean
Minimum Median Maximum
Indicator
Deviation
0
Shumway 50,997
0.02
0.11
0.00
0.00
1.00
1
Shumway
2,045
0.29
0.36
0.00
0.10
1.00
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT
indicating total assets, ACT indicating total current assets, LT is total liabilities, NI is net
income, CSHO is the number of common shares outstanding, and PRCC_F is the price
per share of common stock at the end of the fiscal year. Sigma and Shumway are
outputs of the model specified in equation 6; where Shumway represents the likelihood
of default. N is the number of firm-level observations.
Table 4.21 reports the mean Shumway score (3%). Panel A compares the mean
Shumway score for the sample of firms with bankruptcies in t+1 (0.24) to all other firms
(0.03). Panel B compares the mean Shumway score for the sample of firms with going
concern opinions in t (0.29) to firms all other firms (0.02). These results highlight that
auditors capture the information contained in Shumway scores to some degree during
their going concern judgments.

Table 4.21 Results of Bright-Line Testing of Shumway Models
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
Going Concern Opinions
50,356
641
1,724
322
53,043
Percentage
94.93% 1.21%
3.25%
0.51% 100.00%
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment
Auditor Judgment

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
Shumway with Probability (p>0.5)
51,070
765
1,010
198
53,043
96.28% 1.44%
1.92%
0.37% 100.00%
Shumway with Probability (p>0.7)
51,252
793
826
170
53,043
96.62% 1.50%
1.56%
0.32% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.
Bright-Line Test
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To test the appropriateness of using Shumway default probability scores as a
substitute for auditors’ judgment in the identification of going concern uncertainty during
the planning stages of an audit, I define a bright-line test of Shumway probability at
greater than 50% and 70%. Table 4.22 contains the results of this test. Panel A reports
the errors using p > 0.50. Using this bright-line test resulted in the correct identification of
198 bankruptcies (20.6%) with 765 (79.4%) misidentified of the 963 in the sample. This
test recommends the issuance in 1,208 GCOs, of which 1,010 would be on firms that did
not go bankrupt in the following period (83.6%). Panel B reports the errors using p >
0.70. The 70% bright-line test would predict 998 bankruptcies. Using this definition
correctly identified 170 bankruptcies with 793 (82.3%) Type I errors and 828 (83.0%)
Type II errors. Defining the appropriate threshold for the bright-line testing highlighted a
trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. While the 50% probability bright-line test
identified more bankruptcies (as would be expected), ranking the appropriateness of
these tests cannot be determined without comparing the cost of each error type.

Table 4.22 Simulated Error Count Using Shumway Model for Bright-Line Test by
Bankruptcy Type
Type III:
Total
No Error
Chapter 7
134
41
175
76.57%
23.43% 100.00%
Chapter 11
657
128
785
83.69%
16.31% 100.00%
Chapter 15
2
0
2
100.00%
0.00% 100.00%
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern,
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Bankruptcy Type

Type I:

The sample contains 785 Chapter 11 bankruptcies that may be strategic and not
proxy for a failing firm. This represents the bulk of the sample with sufficient data
availability for the Shumway model. Table 4.24 examines the use of bright line testing for
the 175 Chapter 7 bankruptcies included in the sample. Reported in Panel A, auditors
using the bright-line test with the 70% threshold with the Shumway default probability
score would have identified 41 (23.4%) of these bankruptcies in the period prior to filing.
Type I errors for Chapter 7 bankruptcies (134) represented 76.6% of the Chapter 7
bankruptcies remaining in the sample. Panel B reports that 82 of the 175 received a
GCO in the prior period. This indicates a significantly higher rate of Type I errors using
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the bright-line test (134, 76.6%) than using historic GCO (93, 53.1%) for the sub-sample
of Chapter 7 firms.
Table 4.23 tests the significance of resulting predictions using a Pearson’s
Correlation Matrix. It reports that Shumway’s model is significantly predictive at p <
0.001. The correlation statistic for the model (0.20048) is slightly lower for the Shumway
score than for GCO Indicator (0.20687). This suggests that auditor judgment is a better
predictor of bankruptcy than the Shumway model.

Table 4.23 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings
Variable

Bankruptcy
GCO
Indicator
Indicator

Shumway
(p>0.5)
Indicator

Bankruptcy
1.0000
Indicator
GCO
0.20687
1.0000
Indicator
<0.0001
Shumway
0.20048
0.37705
(p>0.5)
1.0000
<0.0001
<0.0001
Indicator
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report. Model specifications and variable definitions are
provided in equations 6.
Next, I simulated the risk-based auditing environment by transforming the
accounting fundamentals for individual companies to reflect negative news at common
materiality thresholds. Because the Shumway model relies less heavily on accounting
fundamentals, changes in materiality in several scenarios does not affect model results.
For example, total current assets and total current liabilities aren’t variables in the
Shumway model, so the simulations for overstated current assets and understated
current liabilities have been omitted. The panels in Table 4.24 display only those
scenarios where my planned manipulations affected Shumway scores. The number of
correctly predicted bankruptcies range from 188 to 198. The number of Type I and Type
II errors range from 765 to 775 and 931 to 1,013, respectively. It appeared that the
performance of this model was most sensitive to non-material overstatements of assets.
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Table 4.24 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using Shumway Model in a
Simulated Audit Planning Environment
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of Shumway Model Given Simulated Overstatements in Sales
Materiality Threshold
5% of EBIT
1% of EBIT
1% of RE

Type 0:
Type I:
No Error
51,088
766
96.31% 1.44%
51,076
766
96.29% 1.44%
51,098
767
95.33% 1.45%

Type II:
992
1.67%
1,004
1.89%
982
1.85%

Type III:
No Error
197
0.37%
197
0.37%
196
0.37%

Total
53,043
100.00%
53,043
100.00%
53,043
100.00%

Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of Shumway Model Given Simulated Overstatement in Longterm Assets
Materiality Threshold
0.3% of TA
0.5% of TA
1% of RE

Type 0:
Type I:
No Error
51,067
765
96.27% 1.44%
51,067
765
95.27% 1.44%
51,149
775
96.43% 1.46%

Type II:
1,013
1.91%
1,013
1.91%
931
1.76%

Type III:
No Error
198
0.37%
198
0.37%
188
0.35%

Total
53,043
100.00%
53,043
100.00%
53,043
100.00%

Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of Shumway Model Given Simulated Understatement in
Long-Term Liabilities
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
0.3% of TA
51,066
765
1,012
198
53,043
95.28% 1.44%
1.91%
0.37% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
51,067
765
1,013
198
53,043
96.27% 1.44%
1.91%
0.37% 100.00%
1% of RE
51,118
769
962
194
53,043
95.37% 1.45%
1.61%
0.37% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT
indicates total assets and RE is retained earnings.
Materiality Threshold
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4.2.4

Distance-to-Default Testing.
I followed the framework established by Bharath and Shumway (2008) to

estimate the Merton-KMV Distance-to-Default model using Compustat and CRSP to
obtain the financial variables needed for the analysis. From Compustat, I obtained the
total value of long-term debt (DLTTQ) and the value of debt in current liabilities (DLCQ)
on a quarterly basis. From CRSP, I acquired daily stock prices (PRC) and total shares
outstanding (SHROUT) on a daily basis. I obtain the monthly risk-free rate for threemonth treasury bills from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. I used
the SAS code provided by Bharath and Shumway (2008) to fit the Merton Distance-toDefault model and calculated the EDF.
I began by calculating the EDF for all firms with adequate data availability. This
resulted in 297,095 firm-quarter observations. I matched these observations to my
sample of firms from Audit Analytics and isolated the largest quarterly EDF per firm-year.
The matched sample includes 90,746 firm-year observations with adequate data
availability that include 1,199 bankruptcies and 2,859 modified going concern opinions.
Table 4.25 includes descriptive statistics for the determinant variables for Merton’s KMV
model. Panel A highlights the difference in variable means by error type. Firms with
going concern indicators were smaller with a mean net loss. Note that the expected
default frequency is higher for bankrupt and GCO firms, as expected. The mean EDF for
bankrupt firms with GCO warnings is 95%. Bankrupt firms with GCO warnings had the
smallest total firm value of any group, as expected.
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Table 4.25 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables of Merton’s Distance-toDefault Model – Equation 7
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Distance-to-Default for all Firms in
Sample
Standard
Minimum
Median
Maximum
Deviation
AT
63,987 156,033.55 525,167.70
0.06 12,560.22 30,121,763.83
MU
63,987
-0.63
1.75
-25.29
-0.39
32.23
assetvol 63,987
0.90
0.66
0.02
0.72
17.25
F
63,987
39,410.35 660,725.18
0.02
2,209.00 72,701,942.00
EDF
63,987
0.39
0.41
0.00
0.19
1.00
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Distance-to-Default by Bankruptcy Indicator
Variable

N

Mean

Bankruptcy
Standard
Variable
N
Mean
Minimum Median
Indicator
Deviation
0
EDF
62,788
0.38
0.41
0.00
0.17
1
EDF
1,199
0.85
0.28
0.00
0.99
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Distance-to-Default by GCO Indicator

Maximum
1.00
1.00

GCO
Standard
Variable
N
Mean
Minimum Median Maximum
Indicator
Deviation
0
EDF
61,128
0.37
0.40
0.00
0.16
1.00
1
EDF
2,859
0.78
0.34
0.00
0.98
1.00
Where AT is the total value of assets, MU is the expected asset return, assetvol is the
volatility of AT and F is total current liabilities plus one half of the long-term debt.
Table 4.25 reports the mean EDF of 0.39. Panel A compares the mean Merton
Distance-to-Default score (EDF) for the sample of firms with bankruptcies in t+1 (0.85) to
all other firms (0.38). As expected, firms with subsequent bankruptcies have a mean
EDF that is higher than both bright-line testing thresholds (50% and 70%). Panel B
compares the mean EDF for the sample of firms with going concern opinions in t (0.78)
to firms all other firms (0.37). These results highlight that auditors capture the
information contained in EDF scores to some degree during their going concern
judgments.
To test the appropriateness of using Merton’s Distance-to-Default scores as a
substitute for auditors’ judgment in the identification of going concern uncertainty during
the planning stages of an audit, I define a bright-line test of Merton’s Distance-to-Default
probability at greater than 50% and 70%. Table 4.26 contains the results of this test at
the 50% threshold. Panel A reports the errors using p > 0.50. Using this bright-line test
resulted in the prediction of 24,759 bankruptcies--correctly identifying 1,058 bankruptcies
(88.24%) with 141 Type I errors (11.76%). This test would also result in 23,701 predicted
bankruptcies on firms that did not go bankrupt in the following period (Type II errors).
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Panel B reports the errors using p > 0.70. The 70% bright-line test would predict 20,423
bankruptcies. Using this definition correctly identified 993 (82.82%) bankruptcies with
206 (17.19%) Type I errors and 19,430 Type II errors. Defining the appropriate threshold
for the bright-line testing highlighted a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. While
it is tempting to disqualify Distance-to-Default as a useful test for auditors, the relative
cost between Type I and Type II errors must be considered. While the 50% probability
bright-line test identified more bankruptcies (as would be expected), ranking the
appropriateness of the thresholds also cannot be determined without comparing the cost
of each error type.
Table 4.26 Results of Bright-Line Testing of Distance-to-Default Models
Type 0:
Type I:
No Error
Going Concern Opinions
60,341
787
Percentage
94.30% 1.23%
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment
Auditor Judgment

Type II:
2,447
3.82%

Type III:
No Error
412
0.64%

Total
63,987
100.00%

Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
D2D with Probability (p>0.5)
39,087
141
23,701
1,058
63,987
61.09% 0.22%
37.04%
1.65% 100.00%
D2D with Probability (p>0.7)
43,358
206
19,430
933
63,987
67.76% 0.32%
30.37%
1.55% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.
Bright-Line Test

The data requirements for the Distance–to-Default model limit the sample. The
sample of firms with sufficient data for the model contains 986 Chapter 11 bankruptcies
that may be strategic and not proxy for a failing firm. Table 4.27 examines the use of
bright line testing for the 206 Chapter 7 bankruptcies included in the sample. Reported in
Panel A, auditors using the bright-line test with the 50% and 70% thresholds the EDF
score would have identified 108 (52.4%) and 162 (78.64%) respectively of Chapter 7
bankruptcies in the period prior to filing. Type I errors for Chapter 7 bankruptcies
represented 47.6% (21.36%) of the Chapter 7 bankruptcies remaining in the sample.
Panel B reports that 108 of the 206 Chapter 7 received a GCO in the prior period. These
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results indicate a significantly lower rate of Type I errors using the bright-line test than
using historic GCO for the sub-sample of Chapter 7 firms.
The test also provides empirical evidence that the threshold for a bright-line test
using the Distance–to-Default model is sensitive to bankruptcy type. The model was
more successful in predicting Chapter 7 bankruptcies (47.6%) than Chapter 11
bankruptcies (30.8%) using the 50% threshold (when accuracy is measured by count).
However, the model is less successful in predicting Chapter 7 bankruptcies (78.6%) than
Chapter 11 bankruptcies (83.6%) using the 70% threshold.
Table 4.27 Bright-Line Testing of Merton’s Distance-to-Default Model by Type of
Bankruptcy
Type III:
Total
No Error
Chapter 7
33
173
206
16.02%
83.95% 100.00%
Chapter 11
108
878
986
10.95%
89.05% 100.00%
Chapter 15
0
6
6
0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern,
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Bankruptcy Type

Type I:

Table 4.28 tests the significance of resulting predictions using a Pearson’s
Correlation Matrix. It reports that Distance-to-Default model is significantly predictive at p
< 0.01. The correlation coefficient is higher for GCO Indicator (0.19995) than for EDF
(0.15698). This suggests that auditor judgment outperforms a bright-line test based on
the Distance-to-Default model.

79

Table 4.28 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings
Variable

Bankruptcy
GCO
Indicator
Indicator

D2D
(p>0.5)
Indicator

Bankruptcy
1.00000
Indicator
GCO
0.19995
1.00000
Indicator
<0.0001
EDF (p>0.5)
0.15698
0.20500
1.00000
Indicator
<0.0001
<0.0001
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report. EDF is the expected frequency of default from the
distance to default model specified in equation 7.
Next, I simulated the risk-based auditing environment by transforming the
accounting fundamentals for individual companies to reflect negative news at common
materiality thresholds. Because the Distance-to-Default model does not rely heavily on
accounting fundamentals, changes in materiality in several scenarios does not affect
model results. The model only considers current and long-term liabilities. Therefore, the
simulations for overstated current assets, total assets, and sales have been omitted. The
panels in Table 4.29 display only those scenarios where my planned manipulations
affected Distance-to-Default bright-line tests at the 50% and 70% thresholds. It appears
that this model is not sensitive to relatively small overstatements of liabilities.
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Table 4.29 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using Distance-to-Default
Model in a Simulated Audit Planning Environment
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of Distance to Default Model with a 50% threshold for
Expected Default Given Simulated Understatement in Long-Term Liabilities
Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
25,289
111
17,714
854
57.52% 0.25%
40.29%
1.94%
1% of EBIT
25,120
111
17,543
852
57.58% 0.25%
40.21%
1.95%
0.3% of TA
17,083
48
11,562
354
58.81% 0.17%
39.80%
1.22%
0.5% of TA
17,059
48
11,586
354
58.73% 0.17%
39.89%
1.22%
1% of RE
10,892
41
8,490
288
55.26% 0.21%
43.07%
1.46%
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of Distance to Default Model with a 70% threshold for
Expected Default Given Simulated Understatement in Long-Term Liabilities
Materiality Threshold

Total
43,968
100.00%
43,968
100.00%
29,047
100.00%
29,047
100.00%
19,711
100.00%

Type 0:
Type III:
Type I: Type II:
Total
No Error
No Error
5% of EBIT
28,377
152
14,626
813
43,968
64.54% 0.35%
33.27%
1.85% 100.00%
1% of EBIT
19,142
66
9,503
336
43,968
65.90% 0.23%
32.73%
1.16% 100.00%
0.3% of TA
19,142
66
9,503
336
29,047
65.90% 0.23%
32.72%
1.16% 100.00%
0.5% of TA
19,135
66
9,510
336
29,047
65.88% 0.23%
32.74%
1.16% 100.00%
1% of RE
12,309
58
7,073
271
19,711
62.45% 0.29%
35.88%
1.37% 100.00%
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is
total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained earnings.
Materiality Threshold

4.2.5

Summary of Bright-line Testing.
The majority of bankruptcy prediction research evaluates the success and

effectiveness of a particular model using count or percentages to comparing predictive
between models. Table 4.30 provides a summary of count and percentage of accuracy
of bright line testing to historic accuracy rates without considering sensitivity to
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materiality thresholds. The sample size of each model differs due to data limitations.
Note that the Z-Score and Distance to Default models outperform historical auditor
judgment (GCOs) by limiting Type I errors. Auditor’s GCO predictions result in fewer
Type II errors than Z-score, O-score, and Distance-to-Default models.

Table 4.30 Summary of Results from Bright-Line Tests
Panel A: Count of Errors by Type for Each Model Compared to Auditor Judgment
Bright-Line Test

No Error:
Correctly
Predicted
Surviving
Firm

Type II Error:
Surviving
Firms with
Predicted
Bankruptcies

No Error:
Correctly
Predicted
Bankruptcy

Total

233,222

Type I
Error:
Bankrupt
Firms with
No
Warnings
1,944

Historical Auditor
Judgment
1968 Z-Score <1.8
Auditor Judgment
1968 Z-Score Prob >0.5
Auditor Judgment
1993 Z-Score Prob >0.5
Auditor Judgment
2004 Z-Score Prob >0.5
Auditor Judgment
1974 O-Score Prob >0.5
Auditor Judgment
2004 O-Score Prob >0.5
Auditor Judgment
Shumway’s Score – 50%
Auditor Judgment
Shumway’s Score – 70%
Auditor Judgment
Merton’s EDF – 50%
Auditor Judgment
Merton’s EDF – 70%
Auditor Judgment

46,539

1,514

283,219

52,568
125,331
71,050
125,331
75,706
125,331
52,551
125,331
246,638
251,410
204,709
251,410
79,483
77,734
79,784
77,734
39,087
60,341
43,358
60,341

387
1,469
1,471
1,469
1,831
1,469
474
1,469
3,909
2,017
2,092
2,017
1,171
908
1,232
908
141
787
206
787

87,726
14,963
69,244
14,963
64,588
14,963
87,743
14,963
51,468
46,696
93,397
46,696
962
2,711
661
2,711
23,701
2,447
19,430
2,447

2,069
987
985
987
625
987
1,982
987
277
1,549
2,094
1,549
195
458
134
458
1,058
412
993
412

142,750
142.750
142,750
142.750
142,750
142.750
142,750
142.750
302,292
301,672
302,292
301,672
81,811
81,811
81,811
81,811
63,987
63,987
63,987
63,987
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Table 4.30 (continued)
Panel B: Percentage of Historic Bankruptcies Identified
No Error:
Correctly Predicted
Bankruptcy
1,514
43.8%

Type I Error:
Bankrupt Firms
with No Warnings
1,944
56.2%

1968 Z-Score <1.8

2,069
84.2%

387
15.8%

2,456

1968 Z-Score Prob >0.5

985
40.1%

1,471
59.9%

2,456

1993 Z-Score Prob >0.5

625
25.4%

1,831
74.5%

2,456

2004 Z-Score Prob >0.5

1,982
80.7%

474
19.3%

2,456

Auditor Judgment

987
40.2%
277
6.6%

1,469
59.8%
3,909
93.4%

2,456

2004 O-Score Prob >0.5

2,094
50.0%

2,092
50.0%

4,186

Auditor Judgment

2,169
51.8%
198
20.6%

2,017
48.2%
765
79.4%

4,186

Shumway’s Score – 70%

170
17.7%

793
82.7%

963

Auditor Judgment

332
34.5%
1,058
88.2%

641
66.6%
141
11.8%

963

Merton’s EDF – 70%

993
82.8%

206
17.2%

1,199

Auditor Judgment

412
34.4%

787
65.6%

1,199

Bright-Line Test
Historical Auditor
Judgment

1974 O-Score Prob >0.5

Shumway’s Score – 50%

Merton’s EDF – 50%
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Total
Bankruptcies
3,458

4,186

963

1,199

Table 4.30 (continued)
Panel C: Percentage of GCOs Correctly Predicted

Historical Auditor
Judgment
1968 Z-Score <1.8

1,514
3.2%
2,069
2.3%

Type II Error:
Surviving Firms
with Predicted
Bankruptcies
46,539
96.8%
87,726
97.7%

1968 Z-Score Prob >0.5

985
1.4%

69,244
98.6%

70,229

1993 Z-Score Prob >0.5

625
1.0%

64,588
99.0%

65,213

2004 Z-Score Prob >0.5

1,982
2.2%

87,743
97.8%

89,725

Auditor Judgment

987
6.2%
277
0.5%

14,963
93.8%
51,468
99.5%

15,950

2004 O-Score Prob >0.5

2,094
2.2%

93,397
97.8%

95,491

Auditor Judgment

1,549
3.2%
195
16.9%

46,696
96.8%
962
83.1%

48,245

Shumway’s Score – 70%

134
16.9%

661
83.1%

795

Auditor Judgment

458
14.5%
1,058
4.3%

2,711
87.4%
23,701
95.7%

3,169

Merton’s EDF – 70%

993
4.9%

19,430
78.5%

20,423

Auditor Judgment

412
14.4%

2,447
85.6%

2,859

Bright-Line Test

1974 O-Score Prob >0.5

Shumway’s Score – 50%

Merton’s EDF – 50%

No Error:
Correctly Predicted
Bankruptcy
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Total
Predicted
GCOs
48,053
89,795

51,745

1,157

24,759

Table 4.30 (continued)
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Table 4.30 Panel B presents Type I errors as a percentage of total bankruptcy.
This panel shows the percentage of bankruptcies that would be preceded by a warning
under each condition. The 1968 Z-Score and Distance to Default models result in the
lowest percentage of Type I errors. Of the ten primary models tested, six outperformed
auditor judgment for percentage of predicted bankruptcies.
Table 4.30 Panel C presents Type II errors as a percentage of total GCO predictions.
This panel addresses the false positive result. The reported counts may be misleading
because sample size varies across models due to data limitations. For example, auditors
issued 15,950, GCOs for the Altman Z-Score sample firms. A bright-line test using the
1968 Z-Score model specification would have resulted in over 5 times more warnings. In
general, number of warnings issued would be significantly higher using BMP bright-line
testing based on O-Score and Z-Score models. Seven models produce a higher
percentage of correctly predicted bankruptcies. Shumway’s Hazard Model outperformed
auditor judgment in both count and percentage.
4.3

Part 2. Cost Trade-off Between Type I and Type II Errors
During a review of literature, I noted that most studies regarding BPMs evaluate

the efficacy of models by calculating the count of percentage of accurate predictions.
Count and percentages are not the only way to evaluate the effectiveness of a BPM. For
Example, when a firm with a large market value prior to bankruptcy files bankruptcy
without warning, the cost to stakeholders is higher than when a small firm with smaller
enterprise value files. Chava and Jarrow (2004) evaluate models using size deciles,
arguing that different models are more appropriate for different sized firms. They also
classify BMP results by count and percentages after controlling for industry effects
across models (Chava & Jarrow, 2004). However, I argue that count and percentages
ignore market value and the cost trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. In the
following analysis, I attempt to capture the cost trade-off by estimating the cost of
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bankruptcy prediction errors and applying the estimated market cost to a simulated
environment.
I calculate CAR for each firm during my sample period around various windows
surrounding (1) the date or the auditors’ predictive opinion and (2) the date a bankruptcy
was declared or, for surviving firms, one year past the date of the original report. I used
the Eventus tool available to graduate students at the University of Kentucky through the
WRDS portal. Eventus pulls data directly from CRSP stock database, calculates the
CAR or standardized CAR (hereafter, SCAR) according to the parameters set by the
user. To calculate CAR for this research I loaded the entire sample twice. First, I
calculated CAR and SCAR on windows based on the date of the auditors’ report (time t).
I ran the program for CAR and SCAR windows defined as windows at (-2, +2), (-1,+1),
(0,0) (-1, +3) (-1,+30) and (-30, +1). Next, I calculated CAR and SCAR on windows
based on the earlier of a bankruptcy filing date or 365 after time t (t+1). I ran the program
for the same CAR and SCAR windows. I reviewed the resulting tables for anomalies.
General patterns emerged that appeared consistent with expectations. At time t, the
mean CAR and SCAR for companies with GCO modifications or subsequent bankruptcy
were negative. The CAR for firms with Type I and Type II errors were negative across
almost all windows surrounding time t. Standard deviations were higher for firms with
errors, going concern modifications, and bankruptcies. Standard deviations were larger
for longer windows. At time t+1, CAR estimates were near zero or positive for firms
without prior GCO modifications. They were significantly negative for firms with GCO
modifications. At time t+1, The CAR for firms with Type I and Type II errors were
negative across all windows. Standard deviations at time t+1 followed a pattern similar to
time t.
In the next step, I added the effect from both windows and compared average
change in enterprise value (EV) for firms in each of the following conditions: (0) a
surviving firm with no GCO warning, (1) a firm with a Type I Error, (2) a firm with a Type
II Error, (3) a firm with a GCO warning that filed bankruptcy in t+1, and (4) a firm with a
GCO warning that filed bankruptcy in t+2. I note the distributions for combined CAR were
non-normal with high kurtosis and skewed. I found empirical evidence that for firms with
historic errors, the percent change in stock price estimated by CAR was negative with a
high kurtosis and negative skewness. A scatter plot confirmed the distributions were
non-normal with the scatter and histograms of the CAR for Type I error, Type II error,
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and correctly predict bankrupt firms all having leptokurtic density functions with thicker
left-hand tails.
I estimate the change in market capitalization for each firm, using the following
formula:
ΔMRKTCAP = (CAR x CHSO x PRCC_F)

(7)

Where ΔMKTCAP is the change in total market capitalization for each firm, CAR
is the mean combined buy/hold CAR calculated as a percentage of stock price over the
five day window (-2, 2) at time t and t+1, CHSO is the net number common shares
outstanding at year end for t, and PRCC_F is firm closing stock price at time t.
Table 4.31 compares the CAR and change in market capitalization between firms
with and without a GCO in period t. The results are as expected. The CAR of firms with a
GCO is negative with a relatively large standard deviation. Firms that didn’t have a going
concern warning achieved higher abnormal returns across all windows. Panels A
through C report that the estimated mean abnormal change in total market capitalization
is 6-7 times higher for firms without a GCO.
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Table 4.31 Descriptive Statistics of Changes in Market Capitalization based on Going Concern Indicator
Panel A: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 3-Day Window (-1,+1)
GCO
Indicator
0
1
Total

GCO
Indicator
88

0
1
Total

N
37,039
963
38,002

N
21,247
505
21,752

Mean
0.00
-0.02
0.00

Standard
Deviation
0.07
0.18
0.07

Kurtosis
90.92
57.80
124.87

CAR (-1,+1)
Standard
Skew
Error
3.73
0.00
5.31
0.01
4.96
0.00

Min

P5

P95

-0.84
-0.82
-0.84

-0.08
-0.22
-0.09

0.08
0.17
0.09

Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-1,+1)
Standard
Standard
Sum
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
P5
Deviation
Error
-$232
0
26.22 1,676.26 21.27
0.18
-10.56
-904
-2
24.62
84.25
5.06
1.10
-26.37
-1,227
0
26.19 1,647.77
4.96
0.18
-11.00

P95
10.82
12.88
10.85

Max
1.96
2.38
2.38

Table 4.31 (continued)
Panel B: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 5-Day Window (-2,+2)
GCO
Indicator
0
1
Total

GCO
Indicator
89

0
1
Total

N
37,039
963
38,002

N

CAR (-2,+2)
Standard
Standard
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Deviation
Error
0.00
0.08
273.61 6.41
0.00
-0.02
0.21
30.63 3.64
0.01
0.00
0.09
231.27 6.31
0.00

Sum

21,247 $2,594
505 -1,202
21,752
1,392

Min

P5

P95

-0.79
-0.27
-0.11

-0.00
-0.02
-0.00

Max

0.11
0.23
0.11

4.41
2.30
4.41

Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-2,+2)
Standard
Standard
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Min
P5
Deviation
Error
$0
30.29 2,400.44 33.65
0.21
-$573
0.01
-2
26.07
36.13
2.00
1.16
-192
-0.68
0
30.20 2,373.31 33.19
0.20
-573
0.00

P95

Max

13.28
17.24
13.37

$2,130
233
2,130

Panel C: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 367-Day Window (-1,+365)
GCO
Indicator
0
1
Total

CAR (-1,+365)
N
37,051
967
38,018

Mean
-0.02
0.10
-0.01

Standard
Deviation
0.08
0.21
0.09

Kurtosis
440.06
8.37
361.78

Standard
Error
-7.50
0.01
-1.26
0.08
-6.63
0.01

Skew

Min
-73.30
-16.29
-73.30

P5

P95

Max

-1.55 1.57 23.46
-3.54 3.80
9.77
-1.61 1.64 23.46

Table 4.31 (continued)
GCO

Change in Market Capitalization Over a 367-Day Window (-1,+365)
Standard
Standard
Min
P5
P95
Max
Indicator
N
Sum Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Deviation
Error
0
31,193 $2,142
$0
335.39
790.24
-6.36
1.90 -$15,094 -147.42 -147.87 $13,773
1
844 -3,867
5
225.50
196.15 -10.15
7.76
-4,504 -180.43 -180.98
1,350
Total
32,037 -1,724
0
332.96
793.23
-6.41
1.86
-15,094 -147.99 -149.18
13,773
GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern qualifications in the audit report.
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies
were filed in the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file
bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. Where
possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.
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Table 4.32 reports the descriptive statistics for CAR and ΔMRKTCAP for each
condition. Following prior research, RQ4 predicted that the cost of Type I Errors were 35
times costlier than Type II Errors. The results from my sample suggest that total change
in enterprise value for Type I Errors is between 3.24 and 3.41 times less costly than
Type II Errors. I find that the estimated costs do not have a normal distribution. The
distribution is marked by high positive kurtosis which indicates that the distribution has
heavier tails than a normal distribution and that maximum and minimum estimates may
be misleading. An abnormal distribution of CAR could mean CAR a larger number of
outliers than would be predicted in a normal distribution. I examined the plots of the
distribution for each error classification to verify that outliers are not responsible for this
result. I tabulate the CAR at the 95% confidence interval and include ranges in my
estimates to provide a more complete explanation of the estimates.
For sensitivity, I estimate the change in MRKTCAP for each firm over 3-day, 5day and 367-day windows from the date of the auditor’s report. The beginning of each
window is based on the date the 10-K was filed (t). One year past the filing date for
surviving firms or the date a bankruptcy was filed is defined as t+1. The three-day
window includes the abnormal returns of six days: t, the active trading days before and
after the filing at t, t+1 and the active trading days before and after t+1. The five-day
window includes the abnormal returns of 10 days: t, the active trading days two days
before and two days after the filing at t, t+1 and the two active trading days before and
after t+1. The 365-day window begins on day t and extends through the shorter of two
trading after the next scheduled 10-K filing or two days after a filed bankruptcy.
I estimated CAR over defined windows and observed similar patterns and results
with each window. The five-day window (tabulated) captures any fluctuation or effects
due to timing yet is less noisy and eliminates confounds that might be included the CAR
calculated over an entire trading year. Although the 3-day window showed similar
results, it might be too short and include an initial market reaction to bankruptcy news
without subsequent correction. I report the results of in Table 4.34. The change in
market capitalization for firms with Type I errors over the five-day window had a mean
loss of 30.96 (-739.92 to 22.52 at the 95% confidence interval). The change in market
capitalization for firms with Type II errors over the five-day window had a mean loss of
1.07 (-62.26 to 33.13 at the 95% confidence interval). The mean estimate market cost
for Type I errors was almost 29 times higher than Type II errors. This generally supports
prior findings on minimizing Type I errors at the expense of increasing Type II errors.
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Table 4.32 Descriptive Statistic of Changes in Market Capitalization based on Bankruptcy Indicator
Panel A: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 3-Day Window (-1, +1)
CAR (-1, +1)
Bankruptcy
Standard
Standard
Indicator
N
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Min
Deviation
Error
0
37,742
0.00
0.07
130.77 5.10
0.00
-0.84
1
260
-0.01
0.16
10.52 1.45
0.01
-0.52
Total
38,002
0.00
0.07
124.87 4.96
0.00
-0.84

P5

P95

Max

-0.09 0.09
-0.23 0.17
-0.09 0.09

2.38
1.02
2.38

Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-1, +1)
Standard
Standard
N
Sum Mean
Kurtosis
Skew
Min
P5
Deviation
Error
0
21,641 $1.219
$0
26.05 1,690.75
21.45
0.18
-10.43
$764
1
111 -2,446
-22
40.16
5.14
-1.61
3.81 -219 -108.11
Total
21,752 -1.277
-0
26.19 1,647.77
20.96
0.18 -764
-11.00
Panel B: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 5-Day Window (-2, +2)
CAR (-2,+2)
Bankruptcy
Standard
Standard
Indicator
N
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Min
P5
P95 Max
Deviation
Error
0
37,742
0.00
0.09
245.79 6.60
0.00
-0.79 -0.10 0.11 4.41
1
260
-0.02
0.20
5.42 0.74
0.01
-0.78 -0.30 0.29 0.90
Total
38,002
0.00
0.09
231.27 6.31
0.00
-0.79 -0.11 0.11 4.41
Bankruptcy
Indicator
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Bankruptcy
Indicator

N

0
1
Total

21,641 $4,230
111 -2,838
21,752
1,392

Sum

Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-2, +2)
Standard
Standard
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Min
P5
Deviation
Error
$0
30.09 2,421.89 33.78
0.20
-0.79
-0.10
-26
40.45
5.26 -1.78
3.84
-0.78
-0.30
0
30.20 2,373.31 33.19
0.20
-0.79
-0.11

P95

Max

10.82

$1,650

43.51
10.85

52
1,650

P95

Max

0.11
0.29
0.11

4.41
0.90
4.41

Table 4.32 (continued)
Panel C: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 367-Day Window (-1, +365)
Bankruptcy
Indicator
0
1
Total

N
37,758
260
38,018

CAR (-1, +365)
Standard
Standard
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Deviation
Error
-0.01
1.22
371.94 -6.76
0.01
-0.69
1.82
2.75 -0.36
0.11
-0.01
1.22
361.78 -6.63
0.01

Min

P5

P95

-73.30
9.59
-73.30

-1.58
-3.37
-1.61

1.64
2.39
1.64

Max
23.46
4.50
23.46

Change in Market Capitalization Over a 367-Day Window (-1, +365)
Standard
Standard
N
Sum
Mean
Kurtosis Skew
Min
P5
P95
Max
Deviation
Error
0
31,795 $11,109
$0
333.76
791.56 -6.41
1.87 -$15,094 -145.01 149.15 $13,773
1
242 -12,833
-53
193.30
15.90 -1.92
12.43
-1,485 -333.44 151.08
832
Total
32,037
-1,724
-0
332.96
793.23 -6.41
1.86
-15,094 -147.99 149.18
13,773
Where Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator
equals 1 for firms with going concern qualifications in the audit report. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return calculated over
specified windows.
Bankruptcy
Indicator
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Figure 5 highlights the mean percent change in stock price over the five-day
window given historical error types. Following prior studies, predicted bankruptcies were
costlier than Type I errors. The decrease in stock price was 8.69 times larger for Type I
errors. The mean decrease in stock price on a five-day window around Type I errors was
19.519%. The mean decrease for Type II errors was 2.247%. However, that did not
correspond to the same percentage decrease in enterprise value due to differing capital
structures within the historical sample. For this study, I defined the market cost as the
total decrease in market capitalization among firms classified into different error groups
based on historical GCO in t and Bankruptcies filed in t+1. Firms with GCOs in t and
bankruptcies in t+2 were classified as a separate group and not included in the cost
analysis.

Unmodified Audit
Opinion in t

Modified Audit
Opinion in t

No Bankruptcy in
t+1

Bankruptcy in
t+1

No Error:

Type I Error:

-0.041%

-19.519%

Type II Error:

No Error:

2.247%

-39.156%

Figure 5: Diagram of Mean Estimated Percent Change in Stock Price on 5-Day Window
by Error Type
The vast body of bankruptcy prediction research evaluates the accuracy and
effectiveness of BPMs using a simple count or percentage of correct classification. I
used this methodology in part one. Other studies question whether a pure count
adequately measures effectiveness of a method.
I hypothesis that an error in predicting bankruptcy for a firm with greater market
capitalization is costlier to the market than errors predicting bankruptcy for firms with
lower value. By multiplying the mean change in CAR per share (Figure 3) by the total
outstanding shares for each firm, I can compare a naïve estimate of total market cost for
each bankruptcy model. I apply the mean change in CAR to estimate the change in
market capital in time t for each firm. Then, instead of evaluating the precision of the
BMP (i.e. the count of percentage of correctly classified firms), I compare the total
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estimated market cost of errors for each model. As Table 4.33 indicates, auditor’s
historical GCOs have the lowest total market cost per firm and outperform bright-line
testing from BPMs, except for the Merton-KMV model.
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Table 4.33 Summary of N and Mean estimated total market cost of errors on a 5-day window by BPM (dollars in thousands)

Cost per Error Condition

Average
Cost
(per
firm)
$0
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Type 0:
Type III:
Total
Predicted
Type I
Type II
Predicted
Survivor
Failure
Auditor’s GCO
$4,758
($2,164)
$528
($674)
$1,392
Judgment
36,838
201
904
59
38,002
1968 Z-Score
$38,587
($2,218)
($1,499,572)
($35,268)
($1,498,470)
($46)
18,724
52
13,278
347
32,401
1993 Z-Score
$58,891
($7,019)
($386,814)
($25,637)
($360,579
($11)
21,958
60
10,044
339
32,401
2004 Z-Score
$38,587
($2,218)
($1,499,572)
($35,268)
$63,641
($46)
31,995
52
13,278
347
32,401
1980 O-Score
$932
($13,794)
($423,119)
($54,815)
($490,796)
($20)
11,912
462
12,115
101
24,590
2004 O-Score
$19
($26)
($473,136)
($82,434)
($555,577)
($23)
324
6
23,703
557
24,590
Shumway
$8,512
($39,398)
($7,708)
($3,453)
($42,047)
($2)
23,758
495
269
68
24,590
Distance to
$83,596
($24,296)
($5,469)
($83,405)
($29,573)
($0)
Default
60,332
312
2,446
887
63,977
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies
were filed in the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file
bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. Where
possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.

Altman et al. (1977) estimates that Type I errors are 35 times costlier than Type II
errors. I hypothesis (4a) that the cost of Type I errors is more than 35 times the cost of
the average Type II Error. My naïve model for estimated market costs finds that the
mean historical cost per Type I error was ($2,164 thousand) and the mean cost per Type
II error resulted in a $528 thousand increase in market capitalization. Because the data
requirements for each model differ, the firms included in each sample differ. It is
therefore necessary to compare the average change in market capitalization value per
firm for each model. This measure indicates that Type I errors are costlier than Type II
errors by a factor of 5.1. This cost trade-off is significantly different than Altman et al.’s
1977 estimate.
Bright line testing based on each model found that the models are sensitive to
relatively small (i.e. planning materiality) misstatements. My data provides empirical
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the change in total cost of errors due to simulated
misstatements is zero.
Hypothesis 4(c) predicts that a decrease in Type I errors would result in a greater
than 35% increase in Type II error costs. I find that the Z-Score models (1968, 1993,
2004), the 2004 O-Score model, and Merton-KMV have better Type I accuracy when
using bright-line testing to replace auditor judgments. However, average market cost is
higher for the 1968 Z-Score, 1993 Z-Score, 2004 Z-Score and 2004 O-Score. MertonKMV has a lower rate of Type I error but a significantly higher Type II error rate. The
average estimated market cost per firm is closer to auditor judgment (and $0) than
models with lower Type I and Type II error rates. This evidence suggests that Merton’sKMV is more accurate in predictions for firms with high market capitalization. This
provides empirical evidence that costs in addition to accuracy rates should be
considered when evaluating model usefulness.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND INFERENCES
This dissertation encompasses two parts. The first part includes testing the
feasibility of employing four BMPs in the planning phase of an audit. This part includes
simulations to test the sensitivity of models to an audit environment where immaterial
misstatements may subsequently be identified and adjusted without altering an overall
audit opinion. The preliminary results from this testing suggest that certain BMPs would
qualify more companies as uncertain going concerns. The results also highlight that
audit judgment has historically outperformed models at limiting Type II errors. While
some research suggests this may indicate a conflict of interest, my testing highlights the
need for systematically valuing the trade-off between lowering Type I errors while
simultaneously increasing Type II errors. A more detailed discussion of these results
follows.
5.1

Part 1. Discussion of Results Models and Simulations
As described above and in Tables previously presented, I have examined the

results of four seminal BPMs from finance and accounting research: Altman-Z Score,
Ohlson’s O-Score, Shumway’s Default Probability Score, and Merton’s EDF Score.
Regulation requires auditors to evaluate management’s assertions about whether
“substantial doubt” exists for a company to not continue as a going concern. Using the
50% and 70% probability threshold established by “substantial doubt”, a bright-line test
for each BPM evaluates the feasibility of substituting auditors’ judgment with a binary
decision model to issue a GCO. I first tested the classic Z-Score model using the
definition of a score less than or equal to 1.8 as distressed and at risk for a going
concern opinion. I then tested updates Z-Score models after converting the results to a
probability. Three other models were tested. Unlike the Z-Score model, these models
produce scores that can directly be interpreted as probabilities of default. I defined
bright-line thresholds for decision making as a company being identified as distressed if
the probability of default produced through Ohlson’s, Shumay’s, or Merton’s model was
greater than 50%, and 70%. The results of the initial bright-line tests are summarized in
Table 5.1.
In general, historical predictions by auditors resulted in fewer total errors when
compared to application of the tested models. However, four models (the test Z-Scores
as classically defined, the 2004 Z-Score, the 2004 O-Score, and Merton’s EDF) reduced
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Type I errors but increased Type II errors. Anecdotal evidence of public reaction,
litigation results and reputation effects from Type I errors suggest that the cost of Type I
errors is higher than the cost of Type II errors. Quantifying the cost trade-off between
these types of errors is difficult, yet important in evaluating the usefulness of these four
mathematical models in GCO predictions.
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Table 5.1 Summary of Results from Bright-line Tests
Bright-Line Test

No Error:
Correctly
Predicted
Surviving
Firm

Type I
Error:
Bankrupt
Firms with
No
Warnings
1,944

Type II Error:
Surviving
Firms with
Predicted
Bankruptcies

No Error:
Correctly
Predicted
Bankruptcy

Total

Historical Auditor
233,222
46,539
1,514
283,219
Judgment
1968 Z-Score
52,568
387^
87,726
2,069^
142,750
<1.8
125,331
1,469
14,963
987
142.750
Auditor Judgment
1968 Z-Score
71,050
1,471
69,244
985
142,750
Prob >0.5
125,331
1,469
14,963
987
142.750
Auditor Judgment
1993 Z-Score
75,706
1,831
64,588
625
142,750
Prob >0.5
125,331
1,469
14,963
987
142.750
Auditor Judgment
2004 Z-Score
52,551
474^
87,743
1,982^
142,750
Prob >0.5
125,331
1,469
14,963
987
142.750
Auditor Judgment
1974 O-Score
246,638
3,909
51,468
277
302,292
Prob >0.5
251,410
2,017
46,696
1,549
301,672
Auditor Judgment
2004 O-Score
204,709
2,092
93,397
2,094^
302,292
Prob >0.5
251,410
2,017
46,696
1,549
301,672
Auditor Judgment
Shumway’s
79,483^
1,171
962^
195
81,811
Score – 50%
77,734
908
2,711
458
81,811
Auditor Judgment
Shumway’s
79,784^
1,232
661^
134
81,811
Score – 70%
77,734
908
2,711
458
81,811
Auditor Judgment
Merton’s EDF –
39,087
141^
23,701
1,058^
63,987
50%
60,341
787
2,447
412
63,987
Auditor Judgment
Merton’s EDF –
43,358
206^
19,430
993^
63,987
70%
60,341
787
2,447
412
63,987
Auditor Judgment
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.
^ indicates prediction counts that are more accurate than historic GCOs in a given sample
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Recent regulation requires management to make a going concern assertion and
defines the auditor’s role of testing these assertions. My research examines the
usefulness of BPMs in testing management assertions. Results from my testing suggest
that BPMs may be useful as a screening tool in the planning stage of an audit. Auditors
could use discriminate analysis BPMs (such as the 1968 or 2004 Altman Z-Score) in the
planning stage of the audit to identify a large pool of distressed firms based on
probability thresholds established by regulation. However, if auditors use these BMPs for
planning and testing, auditor judgment would still be necessary to reduce the number of
Type II errors in final GCO opinions. The Shumway Hazard model predicts fewer
bankruptcies overall, thus limiting Type II errors. However, historical auditor judgment
does a better job predicting bankruptcies and limiting Type I errors. Merton’s Distance to
Default also has a lower Type I error rate with a high Type II error rate compared to
auditor judgment. This model also suffers from sample loss due to data availability. This
model may be less practical than the Z-Score.
Beyond testing the precision of bankruptcy models, proposing that these models be
used as analytical procedures in the planning stage of the audit environment introduces
the concept of materiality to the usefulness of the models. My research examined the
sensitivity of BMP-based decisions in an environment where immaterial misstatements
may exist. The results of the models’ financial data with simulated errors is discussed by
model in Chapter 4. Overall, bright-line decisions based on the models were sensitive to
manipulations set at the threshold of commonly used quantitative materiality thresholds.
This suggests that auditors should reduce common quantitative materiality thresholds
during audit planning for firms identified as having net loss, little net income, or at high
risk for default. Overall, the simulation results provide evidence that the models would
perform as expected in the planning stage of an audit, but if misstatements are identified
judgments of uncertainty should be reassessed regardless of materiality.
5.2

Part 2: Discussion of Results of Cost Estimation
The first part of this research examines the precision of four types of BPMs by

count and percentages of Type I and Type II errors and the sensitivity of each model to
manipulations at the level of planning materiality. In the second part, I calculated CAR
over several windows surrounding historical auditors’ reports and subsequent
bankruptcies or 10-K filings. I compared the results of the change in stock price for each
error type. The distribution of CAR was non-normal. I graphed the distribution and
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gained confidence that Type I errors were much more costly in the market than Type II
errors. Looking at the results over a 95% confidence interval supports this conclusion. I
found that the results were not sensitive to the window used, so I applied the mean
change in stock price over a five-day window at the auditors’ report in time t and the
subsequent auditors’ report or bankruptcy filing. The results suggest that BMP
usefulness should be evaluated based on more than precision count and error
percentages.
Table 5.2 summarizes the sum and mean change in estimated market
capitalization over a 5-day window for each error type given the bright-line decisions
from Part 1. Historical GCO’s, the Shumway model, and the Merton model result in the
lowest mean cost across all companies. However, note that the total estimated market
cost of Type II errors is higher than the cost of Type I errors for the 1993 Z-Score, 2004
Z-Score, the Shumway’s hazard model, and the Merton’s distance to default. Overall,
the total change in market capitalization is only positive using the actual auditor
decisions. This provides evidence that going concern opinions based on auditor
judgment, not the BMPs tested, results in the highest market valuation. These results
provide evidence to support the continued use of auditor judgment over the application
of bright-line testing for GCO decisions.
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Table 5.2 Summary of Changes in Market Cost Estimated by Applying CAR to Market Capitalization over a 5-Day Window (in
thousands of dollars)
Bright-Line Test
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No Error:
Type I Error:
Type II Error:
No Error:
Total
Correctly Bankrupt Firms Surviving Firms
Correctly
Predicted
with No
with Predicted
Predicted
Surviving
Warnings
Bankruptcies
Bankruptcy
Firm
Historical Auditor
Sum
$4,758
($2,164)
($528)
($674)
$1,392
Judgment
Mean
$0
($25)
($1)
($27)
($0)
1968 Z-Score <1.8
Sum
38,587
(2,218)
(1,499,572)
(35,268)
(1,498,470)
Mean
2
(43)
(113)
(102)
(46)
1993 Z-Score Prob
Sum
58,891
(3,360,133)
(808)
(25,637)
(3,327,687)
>0.5
Mean
3
(335)
(13)
(76)
(103)
2004 Z-Score Prob
Sum
0
(31,396,475)
0
(39,717)
(31,436,192)
>0.5
Mean
0
(981)
0
(100)
(970)
1980 O-Score Prob Sum
932
(13,794)
(423,119)
(54,815)
(490,796)
>0.5
Mean
0
(30)
(35)
(543)
(20)
2004 O-Score Prob Sum
19
(26)
(473,136)
82,434)
(555,577)
>0.5
Mean
0
(4)^
(20)
(148)
(23)
Shumway’s Score
Sum
8,512
(39,398)
(7,708)
(3,453)
(42,047)
– 50%
Mean
0
(80)
(29)
(51)
(2)
Merton’s EDF –
Sum
83,596
(24,296)
(5,468)
(83,405)
(29,573)
50%
Mean
1
(78)
(2)
(94)
0
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies
were filed in the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file
bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. Where
possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.
^ indicates mean change in market capitalization is lower than historic auditor judgment

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
One goal of this dissertation is to identify patterns in the data that suggest future
inferences that are interesting to regulators, preparers, auditors, or other stakeholders.
My results suggest several important inferences. First, Table 9.1 suggests that brightline testing using four BPMs would warn investors about more bankruptcies while
simultaneously issuing many more warnings for firms that would survive. GCOs issued
by auditors resulted in fewer bankruptcies being predicted and fewer “false positive”
going concern opinions (Type II errors), but more bankruptcy surprises (Type I errors).
Type II errors are not costless. In looking at a simple proxy for the cost trade-off between
Type I and Type II errors, my results suggest that bright-line tests for GCOs are not a
good substitute for auditor judgment. However, they may be a useful compliment if
employed during the planning stage of an audit.
In addition, the results demonstrate that going concern predictions based on
bankruptcy models are sensitive to quantitative thresholds of materiality. Initial
assessments on GCO uncertainty based on unaudited amounts using these models
require updating when misstatements are identified even when those misstatements fall
below common thresholds for quantitative planning materiality. This suggests that the
common quantitative thresholds should be lowered for at-risk firms for BMPs to be used
appropriately.
Finally, the results suggest that my research may inform practice. Regulatory
agencies have cautioned against setting static quantitative materiality thresholds. My
results highlight that the use of a bright-line test for all firms may not be appropriate,
particularly in cases where quantitative planning materiality is set using the 5% of net
income “rule-of-thumb”. Table 3 also provides support for the practice of setting lower
materiality thresholds for distressed firms during the planning stages of an audit.
Several researchers and regulators have suggested the use of analytical tools in
the planning stage of an audit. My preliminary results suggest that while bankruptcy
models may highlight distressed firms, they also over-predict bankruptcies. The use of
bankruptcy models during analytical procedures may be justified for firms with specific
identifiable features. Further testing will be required to determine if this finding is a
limitation of only this specific model.
Furthermore, my results inform default prediction research by exploring a naïve
model to evaluate BPMs based on the change in overall market value. My results
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suggest that the usefulness of BPMs need to be evaluated on more than accuracy
counts because a surprise bankruptcy is costlier in larger firms with higher initial market
capitalization than in small firms and firms with already low stock prices.
6.1

Limitations
I am aware of several limitations to my research. The design of this study is

limited by the bankruptcy models selected, the availability of data, and the proxies
available.
Kurruppu et al. (2003) argues that bankruptcy is not the best proxy for going
concern given that the debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws in the U.S. They argue that
statistical models to predict corporate distress and liquidation are better proxies as
filing for bankruptcy does not necessarily mean that a company is not a going
concern. The research argues that a bankrupt company can be regarded as a going
concern until the resolution of bankruptcy, and that company bankruptcy is less
costly compared to company liquidation. They further argue that corporate
bankruptcy is not as costly as liquidation to shareholders and to other stakeholders,
citing that “50 percent of companies that re‐emerge from bankruptcy generate a
return that exceeds the return available on benchmark portfolios”.
I acknowledge that in countries with debtor-oriented insolvency laws (i.e. the
USA), corporate bankruptcy procedures encourage companies in financial difficulty
to continue as going concerns (Franks, Nyborg, & Torour, 1996). I further
acknowledge that companies that file for bankruptcy can either reorganize and
emerge from bankruptcy or merge with another entity as a going concern (Carson,
et al., 2013); therefore, filing for bankruptcy is not synonymous with uncertainty of
the going concern assumption (Schultz, 1995). However, research has shown that
investors expect GCO’s to predict bankruptcy and respond to GCOs as a signal for
impending bankruptcy. I follow this large body of expectation gap and going concern
literatures that use bankruptcy as a proxy for going concern failure. I present data
highlighting Chapter 7 bankruptcy predictions and error rates for BMP studied.
While accountants use quantitative analysis to identify potential material
events and transactions, materiality is not a simple calculation. The SEC warns that
exclusive reliance on any specific quantitative benchmark for working materiality is
not appropriate (Vorhies, 2005). By definition, if an amount would change a user’s
decisions, then that amount is material. Therefore, any amount that changes the
105

bankruptcy decision in a hardline test would be material. However, in practice,
quantitative materiality thresholds, such as the 5%-rule, are commonly used.
Therefore, examining the sensitivity of decision outcomes of BPMs during the
planning stage of audits to set quantitative materiality thresholds is informative.
Limitations for each BPM’s usefulness exist. Some limitations impact a class
of BPMs. Discriminate-based models are only as accurate as the data that goes into
it; therefore, earnings management and fraud affect the usefulness of these
measures. Other models use market reactions to capture information outside of the
annual report (good and bad news) that may affect a company’s ability to continue
as a going concern.
Limitations are also model specific. For example, the original Z-Score was
intended to be used among manufacturing firms only (Altman E. I., 1968). The ZScore also isn't an effective tool for evaluating new companies with little or no
earnings. These companies, regardless of their financial health, will score low.
Moreover, the Z-Score does not directly address the issue of cash flow. Another
limitation of the Z-Score is volatility. Z-scores can swing from quarter to quarter
when a company records one-time write-offs. These can change the final score,
suggesting that a company that's really not at risk is on the brink of bankruptcy.
I estimate market costs using methods from prior literature. I limit my
estimation of the cost of going concern opinions and bankruptcies to the impact of
these announcements on stock prices. This estimation method provides some
information about the overall costs in changes of prediction accuracy. Other costs
associated with Type I and Type II errors are ignored in this estimation. I
acknowledge the conflicting sources of cost between auditors and other
stakeholders. A Type I error is misclassifying a failed company as non ‐failed and are
costliest to auditors, where it would lead to the possible loss of audit fee,
professional reputation and litigation from shareholders (Koh, Model Predictions and
Auditor Assessments of Going Concern Status, 2012). The costs of Type II errors
(misclassifying a healthy company as failed) to auditors include the loss of
professional reputation, loss of audit fee, and litigation due to financial injury to the
client due to the inappropriate audit opinion (Louwers & Richard, 1999). I
acknowledge that my research considers neither the client retention or litigation
costs to auditors nor other related costs to employees, creditors, or other
stakeholders.
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6.2

Directions for Future Research
This research was largely exploratory and initially sought to inform regulators

about the appropriateness of using statistical BPMs in the planning stage of an audit. I
established the hypotheses and research design during the discussion of changing
regulations around the auditing of going concern opinions. These questions remain
relevant as the subsequent issuance of SAS No. 132 provides general testing guidance,
does not address specific testing for assessing going concern risk through analytical
procedures. My dissertation provides empirical evidence of the sensitivity of BPMs in the
planning stage of an audit due to its unique environment concerning materiality.
However, my tests were limited to certain seminal models within the research. As
models that are more current emerge, research should consider how each of these
models would perform in this environment. After all, BPMs are only as good as the data
that they are built from and the financial statements used in the planning stage contain
(by definition) unaudited and unverified amounts.
This research also builds on Mai’s 2010 dissertation from Rutgers University that
identifies the same BMPs for testing. Like so many researchers, Mai assesses the
precision of the models using a simple count of errors. Not only does count fail to
consider the difference in cost to different classes of stakeholders between types of
errors, but it also fails to consider the enterprise value of the firms underlying the errors.
If a model is better able to catch a bankruptcy for a larger and more highly-valued firm,
that model may be more useful for auditor decision making models that perform well in
predicting failures among start-up companies. My research provides empirical evidence
of one other evaluation scheme: a naïve costing model based on changes in market
capitalization using an estimate of CAR. Further research is needed to address the
relative usefulness of specific models for new firms, large firms, and firms with negative
net income.
My research explores one model for estimating costs of errors within publicly
traded markets. Additional models for estimating market costs related to privately held
companies should be examined. This study also ignores switching and litigation costs.
Researchers should take up the call to develop a more comprehensive model for
estimating costs for all stakeholders.
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6.3

Conclusion
Results suggest that BPMs provide a quantitative measure of going concern

uncertainty, which may be important for documentation in the planning stage of an audit.
The results also highlight a tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors and suggests
additional information and auditor judgment is necessary to eliminate excessive Type II
errors. Assuming misstatements at the magnitude of “material misstatements” under
common materiality thresholds influenced accuracy of going concern predictions. When
misstatements are identified auditors using these models as analytical procedures
should update their Going Concern uncertainty assessments. This suggests that
materiality thresholds may be set too high when assessing going concern uncertainty
during the planning stages of an audit.
My study informs the ongoing debate over auditors' responsibility to predict
bankruptcies and warn investors by issuing a going concern opinion. I test the inherent
limitations of the information environment and current prediction models. The trade-off
between Type I and Type II errors does not justify the use of BPMs as a bright-line test
in the absence of auditor judgment. At most, these models may be useful in the planning
stage of an audit to provide quantitative documentation for firms that are low-risk. While
accuracy rates and the cost of errors has been explored in the literature, the difference
in my research and prior studies is that I used simulation to test the sensitivity of the
models to detect bankruptcies given commonly used quantitative materially thresholds.
Investigating quantitative materiality levels provides information about the impact of
materiality thresholds on the use of these models as analytical tools in the planning
stage of an audit. I am unable to make normative conclusions about the equilibrium;
rather this research provides evidence that, given current predictive models and
common thresholds for “material misstatements”, I fail to find a model where the cost
trade-off between Type I and Type II errors improves by substituting bright-line testing
for auditor judgment. I identified no model that could replace auditor judgment, certain
models—where data is available-- may be useful in the planning phase of an audit to
provide quantitative documentation of going concern uncertainty testing. Discriminate
analysis models come with a high total market cost of failure and auditor judgment is
necessary to limit Type II errors. Merton’s Distance to Default and Shumway’s Hazard
Model limit Type II errors, but fail to timely identify bankruptcies better than auditor
judgments.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A Glossary
Term

Definition

BPM

Bankruptcy prediction models are a set of financial models
that are used to predict the likelihood of default.

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

A straight or liquidating bankruptcy that can clear away
many types of unsecure debt with no plan for restructuring.

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

A form of bankruptcy that involves reorganization giving a
debtor a fresh start and keeps the business in operation to
pay creditors over time.

Chapter 15 Bankruptcy

Means to deal with insolvency cases involving debtors,
assets, claimants, and other parties of interest involving
more than one country. This case is generally ancillary to a
primary proceeding brought in another country.

MDA

Multiple discriminant analysis. Statistical method in finance
models used to evaluate multiple variables at once.

Type 0

Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a
going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no
bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year.

Type I Error

Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was
identified as a going concern, but subsequently filed
bankruptcy within 730 days.

Type II Error

Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a GCO
warning was issued, but the firm did not file bankruptcy
within 730 days.

Type III

Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within
730 days before a bankruptcy filing.

CAR

Cumulative Abnormal Return is the sum or the differences
between the expected return on a stock and the actual
return over a defined time window.

SCAR

Average standardized cumulative abnormal return across
all firms.
109

Appendix B Variable definitions
Variable

Description

GCO Indicator

GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern
qualifications in the audit report.

Bankruptcy Indicator

Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed
within 730 days of the audit report filing date.

AT

Total Assets

ACT

Total Current Assets

LT

Total Liabilities

LCT

Total Current Liabilities

NI

Net Income

EDF

Expected Default Frequency, probability of default expressed
as a percentage.

MU

Expected Asset Return

VDIF

ASSETVOL – Penultimate VA

ASSETVOL

Volatility of Total Market Capitalization

F

Current Debt

RE

Retained Earnings

EBIT

Earnings before interest and taxes

ROA

Return on Assets

LM

Leverage Measure. Total Liabilities/Total Assets

N

Number of firms-year observations

CHSO

Common Shares Outstanding

PRCC_F

Price per share of common stock at fiscal year end

ΔMRKTCAP

Change in Market Total Capitalization = (CAR x CHSO x
PRCC_F)
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